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"THE BATTLE OF THE EXPERTS:" A NEW APPROACH
TO AN OLD PROBLEM IN MEDICAL TESTIMONY
Larry W. Myers*
Over a century has passed since the poet mused,
When doctors differ, who decides
amid the milliard-headed throng?'
Since then, the problem of conflicting medical testimony has be-
come more rather than less serious. Poets can ponder, but the
bench and bar must decide.
The testimony of medical experts is essential in establishing
the extent of a plaintiff's injuries in personal injury litigation.
Anglo-American jurisprudence assigns to the litigants the role of
uncovering and producing evidence, much of which is provided by
witnesses whose testimony usually favors the party who calls
them. This is no less often the case where the witnesses are
doctors produced by the plaintiff or defendant. When conflicting
or contradictory medical testimony is presented, a phenomenon
arises which often attains such noticeable proportions that it has
been dramatically labeled "the battle of the experts."
The adverse consequences of this medical-legal phenomenon
cause consternation among the litigants and the public, and are
of constant concern to the courts and the two professions. In
several jurisdictions, judicial, legal, and medical groups have col-
laborated to create programs aimed at resolving or minimizing
these courtroom conflicts. One approach which has met with
much success involves the establishment of neutral panels of
outstanding specialists in various branches of medicine. These
experts are available at the call of the court to perform examina-
tions of plaintiffs in personal injury cases, to report their find-
ings, and to testify, if necessary, in those cases where medical
questions are in controversy.
This study seeks to ascertain whether such a program would
promote the administration of justice in Nebraska.2 It is in-
* B.A. 1962, University of Nebraska; J.D. 1964, University of Nebraska;
member Nebraska and American Bar Associations; presently studying
for the LL.M., University of Michigan.
1 Sir Richard Francis Burton, The Kasidah of Haji Abdu El-Yezdi, Eighth
Part, Couplet XXIX (1853).
2 The present project was begun in the fall of 1964. Research and analy-
sis have been conducted under the guidance of Professor Marcus L.
Plant, Fall Seminar on Medico-Legal Problems, University of Michigan.
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tended to discuss a general problem and to propose a specific
solution. It only presumes to examine the performance of doctors
after they enter the legal arena. The intent is to comment on
medical testimony, not medicine itself, though often the two are
inextricably intertwined. Since the purpose of the article is to
put all relevant considerations before those who must deal with
a problem which affects so many, research has been extended
beyond the usual library investigation.
First, more than three hundred Nebraska judges, attorneys,
and physicians were sent a questionnaire which asked whether
they favored or disfavored the adoption of an expert panel plan
for Nebraska.3 The results of this poll are noteworthy:
For Against Undecided
Omaha-Lincoln Judiciary 6 0 1
Outstate Judiciary 6 3 0
Omaha Bar 27 27 2
Lincoln Bar 13 14 0
Outstate Bar 37 25 0
Medical Profession 29 3 1
Furthermore, theory and statistics have been leavened with
the studied opinions of those who meet the problem every day
and who will be most directly affected, for better or for worse, by
any attempt to resolve it. These opinions reveal several important
considerations which are not reflected by a simple yes-no poll:
(1) Many outstate attorneys favor the expert panel plan in prin-
ciple, but voted against its implementation in their districts be-
cause they feel that there are not enough medical experts locally
available to insure its successful operation. (2) Most defense
counsel favored the plan, while most plaintiff's counsel opposed it.
Then, too, many of these opinions contain extremely interesting
and well stated thoughts. Therefore, quotations from Nebraska
judges, attorneys, and physicians have been liberally included
s The responses to this survey are believed to be representative of the
attitudes of those members of the medical and legal professions who
are most closely concerned with the problem in Nebraska. The indi-
viduals surveyed were members of one or more of the following
organizations: The Nebraska Association of Trial Attorneys; The
Nebraska Orthopedic Surgeons, Neurological Surgeons, Radiologists,
Psychiatrists and Neurologists in 11 DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS(11th ed. 1963); The Supreme Court Judges and the District Court
Judges in DIRECTORY OF ATTORNEYS or THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 6-8
(1964); Professors, Nebraska and Creighton Law and Medical Schools.
The assistance rendered in the individual responses is gratefully ac-
knowledged.
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with the authorities and relevant data from other jurisdictions.
The integrated composite of experience and thought thus obtained
will hopefully present a fair and rational basis for appraising
and resolving the medical-legal phenomenon known as "the bat-
tle of the experts."
I. THE HISTORICAL EXISTENCE OF THE PHENOMENON
The British Medical Journal, dated May 2, 1863, observed:
Medical evidence delivered in our courts of law has of late become
a public scandal and a professional dishonour. The Bar delights
to sneer at and ridicule it; the judge on the bench solemnly re-
bukes it; and the public stand by in amazement; and honourably
minded members of our profession are ashamed of it.4
This criticism of the "battle of medical experts" in England
was paralleled in the United States by the highest court in our
land:
Experience has shown that opposite opinions of persons professing
to be experts may be obtained to any amount; and it often occurs
that not only many days, but even weeks, are consumed in cross-
examinations, to test the skill or knowledge of such witnesses and
the correctness of their opinions, wasting the time and wearying
the patience of both court and jury, and perplexing, instead of
elucidating, the questions involved in the issue.5
Unnecessary divergence in such testimony continued to in-
crease at the turn of the century. In 1901, Judge Learned Hand
noted that "the present system in the vast majority of cases ...
is a practical closing of the doors of justice upon the use of
specialized and scientific knowledge."6  Dr. J. W. Courtney, in
addressing the 1915 graduating class of the Harvard Medical
School, warned that in personal injury cases "the army of wit-
nesses on either side is generally appalling .... They are of two
hostile camps, and prepared to attempt, under solemn oath, to up-
hold opinions diametrically opposed, yet supposedly derived from
a single series of facts and observations. ' 7 Commentators on the
law of evidence have more recently deplored the tendency of
medical experts to become the hired champions of one side or the
other and have looked upon the kind of evidence thus adduced as
one of the most unsatisfactory and unreliable implements of
4 Quoted in TuRN, CALL Tm DOCTOR 2 (1959).
5 Winans v. New York & E.R.R., 62 U.S. (21 How.) 88, 101 (1859).
6 Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HAv. L. REv. 40, 56 (1901).
7 Elliott & Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury Cases, 2 LAw
& CoNTEAW. PROB. 466 (1935).
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judicial administration.8  The professions involved have consid-
ered the problem serious enough to warrant action. The Ameri-
can Medical Association officially recognized the problem of ques-
tionable conflicts in expert testimony and advocated possible
solutions in 1926. 9 The American Bar Association endorsed the
New York method for resolving wide conflicts in medical testi-
mony in 1956.10
Nor have courtroom skirmishes between medical experts es-
caped the critical attention of the Nebraska Supreme Court.
In Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, the testimony was in direct
conflict, and since the court could not accept both versions, it
attempted on its own to take "the better view of the evidence.""
Flesch v. Phillips Petroleum Co. revealed that "the trial in the
district court on the main issue was a contest between expert
[medical] witnesses."' 2 In Lowder v. Standard Auto Parts Co.,
the medical evidence was "diametrically opposite," and the trial
was criticized for again showing that litigation can "degenerate
into a medical experiment in judicial credulity and a judicial
speculation on medical credibility."' 3
Judge Johnsen's partial concurrence emphasized:
[T]he antipodal disagreement of these experts on whether demon-
strable physical conditions exist or not is disappointing and be-
wildering....
The expert witness evil, which is a blight on judicial administra-
tion and a discredit to the medical profession, must sooner or
later be faced.14
In Schmidt v. City of Lincoln, three prominent physicians testified
that the claimant was not suffering from any disability attributable
to the accident, but the court nevertheless found he was totally
8 5 JONES, EVIDENCE § 2287 (2d ed. 1926); McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 17
(1954); 2 WiGmoRg, EVIDENCE: § 563 (3d ed. 1940). See McCormick, Sci-
ence, Experts and the Courts, 29 TEXAS L. REV. 611 (1951); Morgan,
Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. Cm. L. REV. 285 (1943).
9 AMA DIGEST OF OFFCicrA ACTIONS 1846-1958, at 255-56 (1959).
10 [1957] 82 ABA ANN. REP. 184-85.
11 121 Neb. 711, 714, 238 N.W. 319, 320 (1931).
12 124 Neb. 1, 4, 244 N.W. 925, 926 (1932).
13 136 Neb. 747, 756, 287 N.W. 211, 215 (1939) (opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
14 Id. at 756-57, 287 N.W. at 215.
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disabled.15 Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. 6 also evidenced
extreme divergence of medical opinion. The plaintiff's three doc-
tors testified that he suffered injuries that would eventually dis-
able him and which would grow progressively worse during his
life. On the other hand, testimony of the defendant's three doc-
tors indicated "that there had been a complete recovery and that
there are and will be no after effects."'1  Cases such as these
uncover "a painful canker in the body of the law of evidence
which has been festering for many decades to the great discom-
fiture of doctor, lawyer, and layman alike."' 8
Medical disputes in the courtroom currently arise with suf-
ficient regularity to cause concern among members of Nebraska's
bench, bar, and medical profession. A mid-state district judge
complains that "there are too many cases now in which there is
a hopeless conflict in medical testimony." A Beatrice attorney
advocates that "some procedure needs to be put into operation to
get away from this senseless procedure whereby so-called experts
are permitted to give conflicting testimony on the nature and
extent of injuries. It is damaging to all concerned." An Omaha
district judge likewise refers to "many disappointing experiences
prior to and during litigation." An Omaha orthopedist is certain
that "some solution need be sought to the occasional problem of
conflicting medical testimony." A Lincoln district judge states
that "'the. conflicts in .medical testimony in .personal injury cases
are notorious obstacles in the administration of justice. Reform is
needed urgently." This has been but a sampling of the evidence 9
15 137 Neb. 546, 290 N.W. 250 (1940).
16 144 Neb. 394, 13 N.W.2d 627 (1944).
17 Id. at 405, 13 N.W.2d at 633.
18 18 NEB. L. Buu,. 350 (1939).
19 Some other cases illustrate this point. A Grand Island attorney: "I
argued a Supreme Court case last week where great conflict of medical
testimony was the issue. I closed another case in Holdrege last week
which had been appealed because one doctor said the man was a per-
manent total disability case and the other found minor partial dis-
ability." A Fremont attorney: "Recently I had the actual case where
one doctor testified that the injured had a serious injury that required
an expensive operation. 'The other -doctor testified that the injured
had a minor injury that would respond to therapy."
But compare the following statements. A South Sioux City attor-
ney: "We do not yet see the great conflict in competent medical
opinions." A Beatrice- attorney: "We' do not have a serious problem
here." A Fremont attorney: "Generally in this area medical witnesses
are fair, and ordinarily there is a minimum of disagreement between
medical witnesses." A. Fremont attorney: "Seldom is there wide
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that conflicts in medical testimony have become more serious and
more deserving of close scrutiny. The "battle of the experts"
continues to be fought in our courts.
II. THE CAUSES OF THE PHENOMENON
Before undertaking any solution, the potential causes of con-
flict in expert testimony, both legal and medical, must be closely
analyzed.
A. NomvaDIcAL CAUSES
Due recognition must be given to the fact that our legal
system and its participants play a substantial role in perpetuating
conflicts in medical testimony. An awareness of the nonmedical
causes should add perspective to our examination of the medical
causes.
(1) Courtroom atmosphere and procedure
An Omaha physician states that "much of the confusion
produced by conflicting medical testimony arises from the ignor-
ance of the medical profession about legal questions and how to
conduct themselves in court." Dr. Manfred Guttmacher ex-
plains:
The courtroom setting, which is so familiar to lawyers, is to most
physicians uncongenial, and in many respects even repulsive....
That truth, in legal cases in which medical issues are of para-
mount importance, should be reached by biased partisans noisily
developing certain facts and skillfully concealing others, through
resorting to esoteric and highly structured and restrictive formu-
las ... is to him a baffling phenomenon 20
One of these "restrictive formulas" is the hypothetical ques-
tion, regarding which an Omaha physician remarks that "it has
always seemed incongruous for a medical fact-seeking person to
try to operate within a legal fact finding framework." It is in-
deed ironic, as Dean Wigmore observed, that the hypothetical
question, which is truly one of the scientific features of the rules
of evidence, should be the feature which most disgusts men of
science with the law of evidence:
The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused
by the clever, has in practice led to intolerable obstruction of
variance between our local doctors. There is sometimes with the
'expert' from another town. Generally, the doctors in a small town
find agreement before they come to trial."
20 GuTTMACHER, THE MiND OF THE MuDanMR 119-20 (1960).
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truth. In the first place, it has artificially clamped the mouth
of the expert witness, so that his answer to a complex question
may not express his actual opinion' on the actual case. This is
because the question may be so built up and contrived by counsel
as to represent only a partisan conclusion. In the second place, it
has tended to mislead the jury as to the purport of actual expert
opinion.21
This possibility of misuse or abuse led Wigmore to urge that, un-
less required by the trial judge, the hypothetical question should
be dispensed with. Indeed, there is a rule gaining wider accept-
ance today which provides for dispensing with the hypothetical
statement of facts where the medical expert has firsthand knowl-
edge of the facts upon which he is to base his opinion.
22
(2) Difficulties in communication
Communication problems based on interpretation of terms and
questions exist both within and between the professions. Dr.
Andrew S. Watson capsules this interprofessional problem as it
exists in psychiatry:
There very often will be considerable disagreement between psy-
chiatrists in the choice of labels, even though all may tend to
agree on the clinical findings which they observe and which lead
to the process of labeling. This is an important fact in evaluating
the "battle of the experts." The "battle" often has to do more
with the decision of labeling than it does with the observation
and description of the elements which lead to the label choice.23
Trauma is a term in personal injury litigation very susceptible
to such exaggeration of confused theory.24  Trauma has many
dimensions and it is variously defined. It seems to blend with
many subjects which are in themselves highly comprehensive and
21 2 WIG1VmoRE, op. cit. supra note 8, § 686, at 812, quoted in TRAcY, THE
DOCTOR AS A WmTNss 206 (1957). See also SPRINGSTUN, DocToRs AND
JuRiEs 87-88 (1934): "It is lamentable that the law does not require a
hypothetical question to include each and all of the facts which have
been testified to, for with some facts included and some omitted it is
very easy to elicit from expert witnesses opinions which they would
never give if all of the facts were before them."
22 McCoimvcK, op. cit supra note 8, § 34. STsTLER & Mom=s, DOCTOR AND
PATIENT AxD TE LAw 238 (4th ed. 1962).
23 WATSON, LAW ANm PsYcmATRY 220-21 (1965). See Guttmacher, The
Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv. 325 (1955);
Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases,
48 MICH. L. Rsv. 961 (1950).
24 Trauma is used in two senses. "In one sense it is an event-in-time, or
a cause. In another it is an effect, or a measurable change in an or-
ganism, mainly in man." CuRnRA, LAw AwD MEDic=N 203 (1960).
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underdeveloped. Professor Curran states:
[T]he difficulty of communication here between lawyers and phy-
sicians can be traced again to basic methodology. The lawyer is
thinking about the significance of events isolated for the purpose
of logical study. The physician, on the other hand, is examining
the events empirically or experimentally. He is interested only
in what effect the event has on the body.25
(3) Effect of the interplay of trial tactics
"The damages issue in a personal injury case is basically
economic, not medical. Even those factors dependent on medical
proof must be measured and evaluated in dollars and cents. '26
This evaluation reflects the accepted stratagem of lawyers in
their role as professional partisans. That doctors, too, are aware
of this aspect of the problem is evidenced by this opinion of a
Lincoln orthopedist:
[A] lot of these problems in the courts come not so much from the
fact that there is disagreement between the medical experts, as
from certain attitudes on the part of the litigants. Their interest
seems to be directed more at what can be done with the jury's
attitude toward a given set of facts than what the actual set of
facts is.
Carried to extremes, occasions often arise where claims are "so
magnified and distorted that the medical witness who supports
them can find little or no justification for his testimony in sup-
port of them. '27
B. MEDicAL CAUSES
(1) Authentic individual differences of opinion may result from
case to case, when medical knowledge does not provide clear-cut
solutions.
Assuming that the doctors involved are equally competent
and speaking impartially with no thought of the effect of their
words on the outcome of the litigation, there are areas such as
differential diagnosis, causation, disability, and prognosis where
25 Id. at 204.
26 CURRAN, MEDICAL PROOF IN LITIGATION 180 (1961). An Omaha attorney
concurs: "The problem in relation to the trial of personal injuries is
not conflicting medical testimony so much as it is the value to be
attached to a particular injury. Most often, both medical witnesses
come up with the same injury, but each counsel seems to attach dif-
fering values to it."
27 DONALDSON, THE ROENTGENOLOGIST IN COURT 162 (2d ed. 1954).
"EXPERTS" IN MEDICAL TESTIMONY
legitimate divergence in medical opinion exists.28 Dr. James W.
Brooke explains:
[D]ifferent doctors given the same set of circumstances but judg-
ing from different backgrounds of experience may honestly and
competently arrive at different conclusions. By the same token
differing estimates of disability may be submitted by each of sev-
eral examining experts although it is quite likely that they will
not be grossly different.29
Granting that these conclusions are based on complex data
and are opinions, not facts, polar disagreements still should not
arise. Dr. Nicholas Gotten attests that the real difficulty in
evaluating whiplash injuries is due to the complicating factor of
monetary compensation: "[T]here was a wide divergence among
the surgeons as to the severity of the injury and as to the future
prospect of health. . . . Symptoms did not adjust to treatment
.. . but improved after settlement of claims. ... 30
28 Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMp. L.Q. 416
(1961). An Omaha distkict judge acknowledges this fact: "'Most of
our cases involve the spinous process. Contrary opinions may mirror
medical uncertainty." Likewise, the trial fraternity recognizes cases
where honest difference of opinion is normal. An Omaha attorney:
"Our extended iedical inquiry results where conclusions are difficult
and where medical men of equal competence disagree." A Lincoln
attorney: "Doctors are only human and have human failings. Addi-
tionally, medical science is not an exact science. A combination of the
two factors leaves too-much open for opinion.". A South Sioux City
attorney: "Medical science is still too much guesswork." A North
Platte attorney: 'I have the difficulty of not recognizing the practice
of medicine as an exact science but quite to the contrary."
29 BROOKE, IN THE WAx oF TR \mA 460 (1957). See also Eaton, View-
point of the Traumatic Surgeon, 13 MD. L. REv. 299, 304 (1953): "Given
exactly the same facts, even conscientious experts can and will disagree
with regard to their significance and potentialities ... ." See also
Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 18 ANNLs
or INTERNAL MEDicnq 450, 457 (1943): "[M]edicine is not an exact
science, in its totality, but a mixture of science and art. There is
much room for honest difference of opinion and for varying clinical
judgments on open subjects."
30 Gotten, Survey of 100 Cases of Whiplash Injury After Settlement of
Litigation, 162 A.M.A.J. 865 (1956). A Fremont attorney: "The diffi-
cult personal injury cases here are those that involve whiplash or
other soft tissue injuries where the doctors make few, if any,. objective
findings, yet the patient 'complains of considerable pain .... [I]t is
very difficult to determine whether the plaintiff does have a disability."
A North Platte attorney: "There are some cases where it is just be-
yond present medical knowledge to predict accurately or with reason-
able assurance what the condition of the patient would be, say two
years from trial." See Frankel, The Use of Disinterested Medical Tes-
timony, 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 93 (1958). See also McNeal, The Medical
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(2) "Schools of thought" legitimately exist in significant fields
to compound the difficulty inherent in honest differences of opin-
ion.
There are fields of medicine where medical opinions may be
diametrically opposed and still be honest and sincere, because
eminent and respectable medical authorities sharply disagree.31
This disagreement does not concern opinions which may vary from
case to case, but rather involves steadily held conceptions or pre-
conceptions, each of which is usually supported by impressive
authority. The experts become partisan, not to an individual
plaintiff or defendant, but to a point of view. Some of the better
known examples are:
1) Whether a single mechanical trauma can produce cancer
in a susceptible individual or aggravate pre-existing cancer?
2) Whether mechanical trauma can precipitate metastasis
and thus convert what may be an otherwise favorable
situation into a hopeless one?
3) Whether post-concussion syndrome has organic or func-
tional causes or both? Whether the symptoms are neurotic
or traumatic in origin?
4) Whether a normal appendix can be injured by means of a
severe nonpenetrating blow to the abdomen?
5) Whether a real risk is involved in myelography? 32
There is also a lack of unanimity in theory concerning neoplastic
diseases; myocardial infarction due to trauma; the effect of stress
on coronary thrombosis; the effect of trauma on multiple sclero-
sis, Parkinson's Disease, and arthritis; and the importance of
lumbago, sacroiliac, and lumbosacral strain versus that of rup-
tured invertebral disc schools in diagnosing back injuries. It
must be emphasized that the differences of opinion and disputes
between schools of thought are not of the bar's making. They are
the result of the self-commitment of individual physicians to par-
ticular medical theories. "They simply echo the controversies
between men of unquestioned competence and integrity within
the field of medicine itself. ' 3 However, cases revolving around
Expert Witness-Positive-Negative-Maybe, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 528
(1958).
31 LoNr, THE PHYsICIa AND T LAW 245 (1955); Lambert, Impartial
Medical Testimony: A New Audit, 20 NACCA L.J. 25, 29 (1957).
32 Levy, supra note 28, at 420-24.
83 Id. at 423. The alleged injury supported by some of the back strain
schools was often described by defense counsel as "railroad spine"
"EXPERTS" IN MEDICAL TESTIMONY.
such disputes are relatively infrequent. 4 When they have arisen,
Nebraska courts have long admitted the testimony of practitioners
from opposing schools of thought.8 5
(3) Actual incompetence and inequalities in competence
All doctors who testify are not equally competent. Ten
years ago, the first one hundred cases reviewed by the New York
panel of experts were analyzed. "Ignorance" was "the most char-
itable interpretation" that could be assigned to many of the
serious misinterpretations of X-ray findings, failures to examine
spinal fluid in concussion cases, lack of myelogram reports, and
electroencephalographic recordings in fracture cases. 36 Similar
experiences in X-ray cases led a leading roentgenologist to con-
clude that "misinterpretation of anomalies of physiological changes
by inexperienced men attempting to interpret films is another
factor which brings many cases into court. '3 7
Contrary to the expectation which the preceding examples
might engender, the present study suggests that incompetence is
rarely a source of conflicting medical testimony in Nebraska
courtrooms. However, the medical profession does recognize dif-
or "courthouse spine," which according to them would miraculously
and spontaneously respond to the therapeutic qualities of a money
payment.
84 ALLEGENY CouNTY (PA.) MEDICAL SOCIETY, MIEDICAL-LEGAL CoMMITTEE,
RESEARCH AND INvESTIGATION INTO IMPAnTiAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY PLANS
17 (1961) (hereinafter cited as MEDICAL-LEGAL COMMIvTTEE).
85 Bellheimer v. Rerucha, 124 Neb. 399, 246 N.W. 867 (1933).
86 ASSOCIATION or THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL Co1mbiTEE
ON MEDICAL EXPERT TEsTImoNy PROJECT, I WARTiAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY
48 (1956) (hereinafter cited as SPECIAL CO1urrTEE): "The most
striking need for services became apparent in terms of x-ray interpre-
tation. In the unexpectedly large total of 24 cases out of the 100 re-
viewed, errors in x-ray technique or interpretation on the part of the
previous physicians were detected." Errors were due to misinterpre-
tation of normal suture lines as fractures. In over one quarter of the
concussion cases, no examination of the spinal fluid had been made,
though it might have revealed xanthochromia or bloody fluid. In
twenty-nine cases of fracture claims, no myelograms were reported;
yet they might have been important to the accuracy of diagnosis of
fracture of the spine and disc injury.
87 DONALDSON, op. cit. supra note 27, at 162-63. See also Rhoads, The
Roentgen Ray and Medical Expert in the Hearing of Compensation
Cases, 30 AMEICAN J. ROENTGENOLOGY 47 (1933): "[T]he x-ray in the
hands of an expert assists the diagnostician to avoid medical absurdi-
ties .... The x-ray should be in the hands of the roentgenologist
when it comes into the field of litigation."
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, NO. 3
ferent degrees of skill among its members through boards of
specialists and appointments to medical college faculties and hos-
pital staffs. Though in a legal sense all experts must be "quali-
fied" under state law,38 some conflict undoubtedly does arise
where a specialist is pitted against a general practitioner, since
the former is presumptively the more competent, at least in his
specialty.39 This survey discovered no specific complaints of in-
competence as reflected in medical testimony in Nebraska.
(4) Intentional dishonesty or perjury
Perjured medical testimony is apparently rare and relatively
unimportant as a cause of evidentiary conflicts. "Both the medi-
cal and legal professions, composed predominately of honorable
and dedicated men and women, are undeservedly stigmatized by
a small outlaw fringe of brazenly unscrupulous practitioners
.... "0 Though the charlatan, "hireling," or "medical mouth-
piece" usually becomes well-known, he occasionally contributes to
scandalous verdicts.41
The problem is all but nonexistent in Nebraska. In the con-
sensus of opinion, the spectre of fraudulent testimony seldom
arises to haunt Nebraska courts, and Paladin-type doctors whose
unwritten cards read "have loaded knowledge-will perjure" are
noticeably rare.42 Equally applicable to Nebraska are the lauda-
tory remarks of a Philadelphia lawyer:
[N]o such shotgun blast can be maintained with respect to pre-
vailing conditions or procedures .... We are fortunate in having
38 Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d 171 (1956). In some parts
of the country, part of the blame is the lack of discernment shown by
some trial judges in evaluating the qualifications of a witness. See
LONG, op. cit. supra note 31, at 238.
39 A North Platte attorney suggests, however, that this may not always
be true: "[I]n my experience I have on occasion seen a lowly, com-
mon country doctor show up a big city, nationally known expert on
some rather precise points of medicine. I can recall the testimony of
a radiological expert that a femur could not possibly have been moved
for years as it was rigid in relation to the pelvic structure and fixed
by a bone fusion. The country doctor calmly pointed out that the
femur had been laced in a 45 degree angle during the operation. So
you see, it is difficult to say who the expert is."
40 SPECIAL CommITTEE, op. cit. supra note 36, at 8.
41 See Dennison v. Wing, 279 App. Div. 494, 110 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1952).
42 An Omaha attorney: "In the State of Nebraska, the existence of fraud-
ulent claims at a trial court level is almost nill, and without expressing
any disrespect for the great State of New York or New York City,
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a Bar with a tremendous esprit de corps and a justified pride in
its high standards, as well as much distinguished medical talent.
The vast majority of attorneys in this jurisdiction, both plaintiff
and defendant, and physicians as well, do not and will not stulti-
fy themselves .... 43
The medical mercenaries who may not be adverse to travelling
the low path are so few that a program aimed specifically at
distortion is unnecessary.4 4
(5) Bias
Bias is the crux of the problem in Nebraska and across the
United States.45  Though lawyers are traditionally expected to
display vigorous partisanship, the American Medical Association
officially espouses the opposite standard for doctors:
The physician should testify solely as to the medical facts in the
case and should frankly state his medical opinion. He should
never be an advocate and should realize that his testimony is in-
tended to enlighten rather than to impress or prejudice the court
or the jury.46
But a substantial number of doctors become infected with
bias when called as witnesses in the conventional way. "Cast in
the roles of partisans, subjected to hostile cross-examination, and
paid by one side, they tend to color their testimony."47  The
advocate's attitude emerges in opinions expressed a little more
strongly than the facts or the state of medical knowledge warrant
or in the omission of needed reservations when convenient. 41
therein may lie the difference .... In this community we have ex-
tremely qualified and reputable doctors in at least 99% of our cases."
An outstate attorney: "While it is true that we frequently have oppos-
ing and conflicting opinions of medical experts, these opinions do not
have dishonest motivations ... ." An Omaha attorney: "Actually,
we have very few 'knave' doctors."
43 Levy, supra note 28, at 429 n.48.
44 See REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ABA SEcTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIOq
(1960). N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 90, at 78
(1964), reveals that a special committee of physicians and lawyers has
been set up in New York County to expel the small number of mem-
bers of each profession who transgress honest standards.
45 Ford and Holmes, The Professional Medical Advocate, 17 Sw. L.J. 551
(1963).
46 The National Interprofessional Code for Physicians and Attorneys,
adopted in 1958 by both the ABA and the AMA.
47 SPECIAL CommrrTEE, op . cit. supra note 36, at 7.
48 A Scottsbluff attorney: "I find that many, if not most, doctors must
be sorry that they did, not become lawyers. They think they can do
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The bias of the expert medical witness may at first favor the
party for whom he testifies, regardless of whether the party is a
defendant or a plaintiff. But by a perhaps unconscious process
of reinforcement and selection this ordinarily evolves into a bias
which favors a point of view. Thus, advocate doctors correspond-
ing to the two sides of the counsel table emerge: "plaintiff's
doctors" and "defendant's doctors." The conscious and uncon-
scious reasons underlying these biased states of mind are many.
Only some of the more obvious may be identified with certainty.
Sympathy, friendship, misplaced loyalty, prior consultation with
the party, ordinary financial attachments, special fees, or the
physician's basic philosophy may help to color testimony in favor
of one side or the other.49 But whatever the reasons for their
biases, the members of each category soon become well-known to
the bar in their area and the process of selection and reinforce-
ment goes on.5"
better than lawyers and frequently become advocates." A North Platte
attorney: "The prime difficulty is in the physician leaving his pro-
fessional field to become an advocate. As an example, in the past few
days a medical report of a treating physician passed over my desk
wherein the doctor, rather than confining himself to an expression of
his medical opinion, took occasion to express the viewpoint that settle-
ment should immediately be made with the patients." A Nebraska
City attorney: "Doctors become opinionated in the diagnosis and treat-
ment of some disorders and injuries. The specialist is particularly
vulnerable-he becomes 'partial' and fails to read other symptoms
which must be considered (for example, the orthopedist on the herni-
ated disc)."
49 STELER & MoaRiz, op. cit. supra note 22, at 294. A Holdrege attorney:
"One problem is to eliminate pre-conceived and possibly pro-plaintiff
or pro-defendant prejudices on the part of the medicos .... Possibly
these prejudices develop during the man's practice, i.e., who hires him
the most, but they are real factors." A Gering attorney: "[S]ome
physicians tend to be very lenient in rating disability and others very
conservative-this may be motivated by who pays them, but in other
instances it represents a basic philosophy of the physician." An Omaha
attorney: "Many doctors gain a reputation for being honestly bent in
a way that also happens to be favorable to either plaintiff or defendant,
i.e., some stress the possible complications more than others."
50 A Lincoln district judge: "[T]he same medical witnesses testify in
case after case for their price. They are skillful witnesses and ex-
pensive .... The need for reform is greater in our metropolitan
area, as the usual family doctor is forthright, and the difficulties lie
with the medical specialist .... It is only a key few that cause the
problem." A Lincoln attorney: "The problem is serious only in
Douglas, Sarpy and Cass Counties. There is no substantial segment of
the medical profession in other parts of the state who distort opinion
for gain. The few who do are known outside the area affected by
metropolitan influence." A Scottsbluff attorney: "In the smaller com-
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A prominent Boston lawyer vehemently criticized the situa-
tion in 1910:
[T]he regular court experts not only come to be tagged in court
as "plaintiff's experts" or as "defendant's experts," but they come
in their practice more or less unconsciously to get into a chronic
one-sided medical point of view. Habitually, the plaintiff's ex-
pert sees or magnifies injuries, symptoms and resultant ill effects
which the defendant's experts minimize ... altogether. The
plaintiff's expert has argued and reasoned himself into a frame of
mind that sees in the given case just what the plaintiff's attorney
needs. On the other hand, the defendant's expert sees a malin-
gerer in every man who asks damages. It is the old story of
bringing to the market what the market demands.51
A Kearney attorney recognizes that the same problem exists
today:
Frankly, I have found most doctors do become slanted in their
outlook on this matter of examination and, relatively soon in their
practice, become identified with either the defendant's side of
the bar or that of the -plaintiff .... We utilize almost exclu-
sively orthopedic surgeons, neurologists and internists from Oma-
ha, Lincoln, Hastings and Grand Island-virtually all of these
people have become rather definitely identified as either "plain-
tiff's doctors" or "defendant's doctors."
While a few Nebraska attorneys feel that the problem is un-
important in their areas, 52 there is a general awareness of its
existence with the usual result that plaintiff's lawyers disparage
defendant's doctors, 53 defense counsel decry plaintiff's doctors, 4
munities you will find a great many plaintiff doctors and defendant
doctors, and generally those that represent insurance companies and
industries are defendant's doctors and those who do not are plaintiff
doctors." A Holdrege attorney: "Every personal injury lawyer, on
either side, knows who the 'defendant doctors' and the 'plaintiff doc-
tors' are in his community and state."
51 Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALz L.J.
247, 253 (1910).
52 A Fremont attorney: "In one recent case in which I represented the
defendant, I found that the plaintiff's family doctor, who had treated
her in addition to an orthopedic specialist, found far less injury in
the plaintiff than did either the orthopedic specialist or the doctor
whom I had examine the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant. The
plaintiff failed to call the family doctor as a witness so I called him
myself as a witness for the defendant." A Grand Island attorney:
"Most local doctors are cooperative and testify without bias, prejudice
or favoritism."
53 An Omaha attorney: "Very frankly, some doctors have unconsciously
become favorable to insurance companies, because in these days of
Blue Cross and other related insurance programs, the services of most
doctors are paid for by insurance companies." An Omaha attorney:
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and the medical profession itself censures both sides. 55
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHENOMENON
The battle of the experts must be viewed in light of the fact
that personal injury cases constitute at least eighty per cent of the
litigation in most of our courts.56 The compensation awarded vic-
tims of personal injury accidents in a recent year totalled nearly
four billion dollars. The annual total will continue to be pushed
upward by the increased claim consciousness of the American pub-
lic.57 Underscoring this fact are trends toward popularity of
"Each trial lawyer is also well-acquainted with a number of so-called
defense doctors who will completely disregard the complaints of the
examinee, as well as the history given in connection with the injuries
sustained. Instead they are inclined to depend almost solely and en-
tirely upon their own opinion as to pathology as represented in X-rays
along with their observance of objective symptoms. Such defense
physicians when faced with a history of pain will refuse to accept that
history as true unless they find some objective symptom to substantiate
it. In other words, stating it more simply in the language of the trial
lawyer, they are the 'Doubting Thomases' who will not believe unless
they can place their hands in the wound." A North Platte attorney:
"The problem is that of impartiality. There are some doctors who tell
me that my client is not injured and I believe it implicitly; but there
are others who, in my judgment, are not worthy of belief. I represent
primarily plaintiffs, but I'm sure defendant's counsel feels the same
way." An outstate attorney: Our local doctors fall easy victims to
the insurance companies who pay relatively small doctor's fees and
then take them out of the patient's settlements."
54 A North Platte attorney: "The prime difficulty lies in the tendency
of physicians attending claimants to be immersed with the claimant's
viewpoints as well as the claimant's asserted aches and pains." An
Omaha attorney: "Like it or not, the plaintiff's personal doctor custom-
arily views the medical picture in the light most favorable to his
patient. This is the conscious or unconscious result of personal ac-
quaintance, a still unpaid doctor bill or other reasons."
55 An Omaha orthopedist: "I am personally acquainted with a number of
highly competent physicians who do a good deal of courtroom work
who, I think, are fairly prejudiced in cases in which they testify. I
cannot feel they are serving the interests of justice with such an atti-
tude." An Omaha orthopedist: "I avoid as much as possible going
to court. This is not true of a small group of M.D.s who seem to enjoy
going to court. Why?-often times when such a so-called expert is
going to court you know he is a so-called 'defense doctor' or 'plaintiff
doctor.'"
56 Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony, 30 PA. B.A.Q. 348 (1959); Peck,
Impartial Medical Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21, 22 (1959). A Lincoln dis-
trict judge verifies that "nearly 80% of our civil trials involve tort
actions involving personal injuries."
57 Conrad and Voltz, The Economics of Injury Litigation, 39 Micm ST.
B.J, 32 (1960).
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pressing personal injury claims, expansion of tort liability, and a
broadening concept of social responsibility tempered by a con-
sideration of capacity to bear the loss.58
Against this background, the importance of accurate medical
testimony becomes increasingly important. Recovery in every
personal injury case hinges at least partially on medical evidence.
Indeed, it is estimated that seven out of ten personal injury cases
are decided on medical considerations rather than legal ones.5 9
This setting presents four possible injurious effects.
A. INJUSTICE TO INIVIDUAL LITIGANTS THROUGH
CONFUSION OF THE COURT AND JURY
Several years ago, a Nebraska Supreme Court justice ex-
pressed his frustration in trying to reconcile medical testimony
disputes by remarking, "I, for one, feel the need of a compass."60
Judge Hand believed that such insurmountable uncertainty is
often manifest in the "august assemblage of our peers" when
confronted with a complicated medical controversy. 61 If judges
may be thus confused, it is unrealistic to believe that juries are
not. Conflicting medical testimony does not always hopelessly
confuse the jury,62 but in many cases perceiving which doctors
58 Knepper, The Automobile in Court, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 213 (1960);
Rassman, Of Torts and Defendants, 16 Sw. L.J. 244 (1962); Survey,
Personal Injury Damage Award Trends, 10 CLEv.-MnAW L. REv. 193
(1961).
59 PECK, COURT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES To MTEET THE NEED OF
MODERN SOCIETY 15 (1958); Small, Personal Injury Law: Law Schools
Need To Give a Shot of Medicine, 41 A.B.A.J. 693 (1955). A western
Nebraska judge qualifies this point by explaining that "medical testi-
mony only supplies a portion of the evidence which a jury needs to
consider in determining dollar awards. As to pain and suffering, the
testimony of the attending* physician is the only authoritative expert
testimony, although the nurse's is often more graphic." An Omaha
attorney: "I would rather think that the conclusion reached by a doc-
tor as to the extent of injury and its duration has little effect on the
jury. Examples of this are the verdicts rendered in herniated disc
cases involving men who have only skills for heavy labor. Juries have
a tendency to award damages in varying degrees depending upon the
visibility of the injury itself and the presentation of the day to day
activities of the injured."
60 Lowder v. Standard Auto Parts Co., 136 Neb. 747, 757, 287 N.W. 211,
215 (1939) (separate opinion of Johnson, 3.).
61 Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Tes-
timony, 15 HAnv. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901).
62 An Omaha attorney: "It has been my experience and is my firm con-
viction that a jury which has the benefit of the testimony of the plain-
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have most accurately described the plaintiff's condition is a task
which places the jury in the twilight zone between just and un-
just decisions.
Knowing little or nothing about medicine themselves, they are
ill-equipped to measure medical skill and knowledge. As far as
partiality, that is so subtle and elusive that it can seldom be ex-
posed in courts. Hence, the decision to believe one doctor over
another is likely to be predicated upon nothing more substantial
than courtroom manner, personality, or forensic ability.63
Recent conferences with the federal judges in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois bear out this assertion. The testifying doctor who
has the greater experience in the courtroom and who is the more
eloquent may win the minds of the jurors over the doctor who
may give more appropriately qualified but less eloquent testi-
mony on the matter in question.64 When men of medicine can-
not convince their own brethren, a lay jury cannot be expected to
consistently resolve the resulting uncertainties. Polar conflicts
in medical testimony undoubtedly serve as a frequent source of
confusion to jurors. 65
The confusion is no less apparent and much more regrettable
where the confusing testimony is attributable to the bias of expert
witnesses. Judge Jerome Frank wrote that "in the light of the
fact that juries 'try the lawyers,' it is peculiarly true, in many a
jury trial, that a man's . .. property often depends on his law-
yer's skill or lack of it in ingratiating himself with the jury
rather than on the evidence." 66 Where the existence or extent of
tiff's doctor, as well as the defendant's doctor, has a somewhat uncanny
knack of ascertaining which of the two doctors is the more accurate
and the more correct in his conclusion and will render its verdict ac-
cordingly."
63 SPECIAL COMVITTEE, op. Cit. supra note 36, at 6. N.Y. JuDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 94, at 113 (1959): "Thus, to a large ex-
tent personal injury litigation had come to rest upon the inexpert
judgment of a lay jury as to the highly technical and conflicting opinions
of the particular medical witnesses called to support the opposing
claims of the contending litigants who hired them."
64 MEDICAL-LEGAL COMMITTEE, OP. cit. supra note 34, at 14. See also
SPRiNGSTUN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 74: 'When experts disagree no one
knows how a jury reaches a conclusion .... There is a strong suspi-
cion that such a conclusion is never reached, but that the jury simply
ignores the expert evidence produced by both sides .... If experts
cannot agree, certainly juries cannot be expected to agree."
65 SHARTEL & PLANT, LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 336 (1959); TRACY, THE Doc-
TOR AS A WrrNEss 208 (1957).
66 FRANx, CoURTs ON TRIAL 122 (1949).
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physical injuries is at issue, a man's property may depend as
much or more upon the personality of his expert medical witness.
Where the most persuasive witness also presents the most ob-
jectively accurate testimony, no injustice is done. But where the
personal persuasiveness of the doctor is coupled with some de-
gree of subjective motivation, this is no longer so. That the
personalities of opposing counsel may influence the outcome of a
jury trial is a perhaps unfortunate characteristic of the adversary
system, but it is at least explicable within the context of that
system. Lawyers are expected to be partisan advocates. But the
expert medical witness is expected to be objective, and any sub-
stitution of personality for objective information is unjustified.
B. MISUNDERSTANDING AND DISSATIsFAcTIoN BETWEEN
THE MEDIcAL AN LEGAL PROFEssIONs
The reliance on partisan expert testimony has caused long
standing professional discontent among doctors, lawyers, and
judges.67 Dr. Joseph Sadusk, Jr., states that despite an ever in-
creasing need for expert medical testimony, "unfortunately, attor-
neys found that the average physician was loath to appear in
court, due to the fact that he was cast into an atmosphere foreign
to his training and philosophy.' 68 This reluctance in many out-
standing physicians, is partially attributable to the battle of ex-
perts:
This spectacle has so distressed many good doctors that they
have refused to have anything to do with litigation. They will
neither hire themselves out as partisans nor be treated as if they
had. Their withdrawal, unfortunately, has only smoothed the
way for less able and upright members of the profession and thus
compounded the evil. 69
67 See notes 9 & 10 supra.
68 Sadusk, Obtaining Expert Advice in Professional Liability Cases, Case
& Com., Sept.-Oct. 1964, p. 1. Dr. Sadusk is past chairman of the Com-
mittee on Medico-Legal Problems of the American Medical Association.
69 SPEcIAL CoMmir, op. cit. supra note 36, at 8. The casting of the
expert in the role of a partisan has caused some of the ablest physi-
cians to shun the courtroom. Dr. Guttmacher testifies: "I am led to
believe that the same reluctance on the part of leaders of the profes-
sion to testify in courts exists in all branches of medicine .... I can
assert conservatively that more than ten per cent of psychiatrists
refuse all courtroom employment and that another twenty per cent
refuse employment as partisan experts-they are only willing to tes-
tify when cast in the role of neutral advisor to the court. ... [I]n
this dissenting third are to be found most of the leaders of American
psychiatry." GunwmAcHER, op. cit supra note 20, at 118-19.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
This same atmosphere of conflict has taken its toll in Ne-
braska, as reflected by the number of outstanding doctors who
abstain from appearing in court.7 0 This reaction of reluctance
sets in motion a vicious circle. Their refusal to participate volun-
tarily in litigation in turn tends to irritate the bar.71 It also
increases the demand for those doctors who enjoy medical advo-
cacy. Judge Yeager of the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasizes
how seldom lawyers shun biased testimony:
I have had experience in this matter of expert testimony of medi-
cal witnesses in the area of selection. The only thing in that
area that ever impressed me as of any great value was a rare
situation when the parties wanted an unbiased testimony and
agreed that the witnesses should know nothing about the con-
troversy. 72
70 A Lincoln neurological surgeon: "I personally rebel against the so-
called 'battle of experts' in the courtroom. I absolutely refuse to testify
as a partial medical witness in anyone's behalf. You are aware of the
reticence of the physician to testify in court, I am sure. I must confess
that I personally have testified in court only very infrequently the past
several years .... This change in my attitude stemmed from attempts
at discrediting me as a witness. I hasten to add, however, that the
great majority of attorneys in Lincoln do not stoop to unkind tactics."
A mid-state attorney: "At the present time there is a tremendous re-
luctance on the part of the real medical experts to become involved in
lawsuits because of unpleasant experiences, loss of time and the fact
that they are in a strange field." A McCook attorney: "The present
adversary system by experts tends -to- produce -contempt for witnesses
who should substantially agree- in their conclusions. This reflects
discredit on otherwise competent doctors.""
71 An Omaha attorney: "Doctors are becoming less and less cooperative
as medical witnesses and are using all types of excuses to evade the
duty which they owe to their patients to testify in their behalf in court."
A Lincoln attorney: "Too often there is great difficulty on the part of
a claimant in getting a medical expert to testify and to give to the
attorneys the cooperation necessary before testifying. A doctor is
usually extremely busy, reluctant to take the time that is required for
proper preparation for festifying, resents being subjected to cross-
examination, and extremely dislikes having his opinion pitted against
those of his colleagues .... Unquestionably there have been some
inequities that have arisen attributable directly to the reluctance of
the medical witness to go to .court." A Scottsbluff attorney: "The
lawyers generally in western Nebraska are very much disappointed
with local doctors. They seem to forget that they owe a duty to their
patient to take time off to consult with lawyers and then to appear in
court and give a direct unqualified opinion. Quite often the doctors
become quite angry when they are required to give depositions or take
any time away from their practice, and being angry, they do not make
good witnesses."
72 Letter From Judge John W. Yeager, Nebraska Supreme Court, Nov.
28, 1964. (Emphasis added.),
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This process culminates in adversaries seeking doctors who are
"good witnesses" and who will support extreme positions.1 3  It
often results in attempts at impugning a doctor's testimony to
counterbalance the anticipated insinuations from opposing coun-
sel. Genuinely expert witnesses are brought into disrepute, and
they and their well qualified colleagues thereafter refrain from
undergoing the same experience.
C. DISILLUSIOMENT TO LAYmN WHO ARE
TOUCHED BY COURT PROCESS
Large discrepancies in medical claims are disappointing and
bewildering to laymen and undoubtedly tend to diminish public
faith in the medical profession's skill and scientific impar-
tiality. "This has led to a belief by the laity . . .that any plain-
tiff with a poor case or any defendant with a poor defense, with
sufficient use of the coin of the realm, may find a medical witness
to support his claim or his defense." 74
There is the further public belief that, if the witness is
skillful in his interpretation of the facts, he may influence the
jury to render an unjust verdict. When they see minor injuries
inflated into large recoveries and substantial injuries treated as if
trivial, they tend to lose respect for the judicial process and its
participants. "They see in too many accident cases that a trial is
not a sober, logical search for the truth, but something that has
deteriorated into an expensive, and sometimes cruel, game of
chance."75
D. LACK OF PRETRIAL SETLEm T AND
SUBSEQUENT COURT CONGESTION
In many metropolitan courts across the country, the backlog
of cases awaiting trial is one of the major causes of dissatisfaction
73 A Lincoln district judge remarks, "The same witnesses testify time
after time and for their price. They are skillful witnesses and expen-
sive." An Omaha orthopedist verifies that "a small number of M.D.s
seem to enjoy going to court." As long ago as 1876 an English judge
commented on this inclination of a party to find not the best scientist,
but the best witness: "[T]he result is that the Court does not get that
assistance from the experts which, if they were unbiased and fairly
chosen, it would have a right-to expect." Thorn v. Worthington Skat-
ing Rink Co., (M.R. 1876), reproduced in Plimpton v. Spiller, 6 Ch. D.
412, 416 (1877), quoted in McCoRmvcK, EviFicE § 17, at 35 (1954).
74 TRAcY, op. cit. supra note 65, at 208.
75 SPEciAL Com-nmr-Ers, op. cit. supra note 36, at 8. See also Botein, Im-
partial Medical Testimony, 328 Annals 75 (1960).
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with the administration of personal injury litigation.7 There is a
connection between this condition and the battle of the experts.
Settlements are not made fast enough or on a large enough scale
to keep up with the flood of litigation. In many cases, the
parties are unable to agree upon the nature of the injuries
suffered by the plaintiff. If counsel were able to predict with
reasonable assurance the medical findings which would be made
in the event of trial, the areas of disagreement would be sub-
stantially narrowed.
It is always desirable to increase opportunity for settlements
that tend to be equitable to both parties, but the related problem
of court congestion which plagues many other jurisdictions does
not exist in Nebraska. Delay becomes a serious matter only
when counsel who are desirous of and ready for trial are unable
to have their cases tried within a reasonable number of months.77
Based on this criterion, Nebraska courts are doing a meritorious
job in moving lawsuits. An Omaha defense attorney summarizes:
Actually, court congestion in Nebraska would have to be entirely
based perhaps on the Douglas County-Omaha area, as we are the
only large metropolitan area in which there is a big volume of
trial litigation going on. Frankly, our local courts are doing an
excellent job in moving lawsuits. Any plaintiff lawyer who de-
sires and is pushing can have his client's case heard within an
eight months period. This is actually soon enough.T8
76 Delay in Detroit is presently three years. In Chicago, it is three to four
years. A decade ago, court congestion in New York County had be-
come so bad that negligence cases had to wait three or four years to
be tried after issue was joined. But the bottleneck was only in per-
sonal injury litigation. See SPEciAL CommrTrE, op. cit. supra note 36.
Today there is general agreement among the judges of the New York
Supreme Court's First Department that 80%-90% of the cases appearing
on the calendar will never reach trial and only 3% will ever go to
verdict. N.Y. JumicL CoNFERENCE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 91, at 88
(1963).
77 Ibid.
78 A Lincoln attorney: "We have no congestion to speak of." A Kearney
attorney: "We have no court congestion in this area." A Scottsbluff
attorney: "Dockets are reasonably current in western Nebraska." The
understatement of the survey was humorously written by an outstate
county attorney: "We have no congestion in this county-over a
period of the last fifteen years, our average number of jury cases in
the district court has been less than one in two years. Anyone having
a case at issue can get it tried as soon as the issues are made up."
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IV. THE HISTORY AND RESULTS OF AMERICAN MEDICAL
TESTIMONY PLANS-THE CASE FOR THE COURT-
APPOINTED EXPERT SYSTEM
A. NoNJUnIcIAL MEDicAL TESTImONY PLANS
The Minnesota Plan establishes what is essentially a policing
technique.7 9 Since 1940, it has been a cooperative effort by the
Minnesota State Medical and Bar Associations. The medical as-
sociation maintains a committee on medical testimony to review
reports and testimony of medical witnesses. Whenever a judge,
hearing officer, attorney, or physician suspects medical testimony
is false or so clearly wrong as to reflect incompetence or undue
partisanship, he may write a letter to the medical society. The
committee reviews the transcript and various specialists express
opinions on the testimony in question. If the charges are sub-
stantiated, the committee either sends a private reprimand to the
physician or in more serious cases refers the matter to the State
Board of Medical Examiners. The board may suspend or revoke
a doctor's license.
The plan's effectiveness in its earlier years was definite and
marked. From 1940 to 1956, the committee investigated thirty-
four cases, censured witnesses in seventeen cases, and referred ten
cases to the board of examiners. The board disciplined a wit-
ness in only one case. Few cases have been reported in recent
years and only one case presently pends before the committee.80
The Minnesota Plan .warrants praise in that it makes doctors
strictly accountable to their medical peers. The risk of discipline
undoubtedly restrains exaggeration in medical testimony, but its
influence is limited to the extent that members of either profes-
sion are reluctant to come forward and brand their fellow practi-
tioners as unethical.81 Also, the plan is only curative, not pre-
ventive. Disciplining the witness after the trial is little consola-
tion to the party harmed by the testimony.
On a lesser scale, the plan spread to the Illinois Medical
Societies (where it apparently "died a natural death"8 2), the Har-
79 Hammes, The Control of Medical Testimony-The Minnesota Experi-
ment, 28 MN. IVAEDIcnuE 111 (1945); Anderson, Medical Testimony in
the Courts, 43 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 79 (1959).
80 Letter From Harold W. Brunn, Executive Secretary of the Minnesota
State Medical Association, Nov. 19, 1964.
81 Barr, Medical Testimony: Doctors and Lawyers Cooperate, 41 J. A.m.
JuD. Soc'v 78 (1957).
82 See McKnight, The Minnesota Plan for Expert Medical Testimony, 28
CHrcAGO B. REcoRD 179 (1947).
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ris County (Texas) Medical Society, and the states of Washington
and Kansas.8 3
B. COURT-APPOINTED EXPERT SYSTEMS
The idea of the court-appointed expert originated in Roman
law, which considered physicians more as amicus curiae or
"friends of the court" than as witnesses. "Medici proprie non
sunt testes, sed est magis judicium quam testimonium" was
Baldus' gloss on the Code Justinian. 4  It developed in the civil
law countries of Europe, where the expert is part of the judicial
system. He is an officer of the court and approaches medical
testimony with a judicial mind, rather than as a zealous advo-
cate.8 5 The right of a common law court to call in witnesses on
its own initiative was seen to arise from the inherent judicial
power to do all possible to obtain evidence relevant to an en-
lightened judgment. Dean Wigmore describes the source of this
right:
But the general judicial power itself, expressly allotted in every
State constitution, implies inherently a power to investigate as
auxiliary to the power to decide; and the power to investigate
implies necessarily a power to summon and to question witnesses
.... The trial judge, then, may call a witness not called by the
parties, or may consult any source of information on topics sub-
ject to judicial notice .... 86
Since the turn of the century, American commentators and
various organized groups have promoted programs to utilize ex-
perts appointed by the court.8 7 The programs have been designed
83 Another type of nonjudicial testimony plan that has grown up in the
last decade is the expert witness and advisory panel plan for malprac-
tice cases in San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Medical
panels review potential malpractice cases. If they agree with the
claimant, they are committed to testify to this conclusion. If they dis-
agree, the lawsuit has little chance of success. The bar is enthusiastic
over the conscientious service rendered by the physicians and by the
fact that more settlements now occur. The medical profession is
pleased about determining its own standards and the fact that fewer
questionable suits are commenced. For an excellent article on the
details of the malpractice review plans, see Sadusk, supra note 68.
84 ORDRONAUX, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDICINE 125 (1869).
85 Schroeder, Problems Faced by the Impartial Expert Witness in Court:
The Continental View, 34 TEmp. L.Q. 378 (1961).
88 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2484 (3d ed. 1940). NEB. CoNsT. art. V appar-
ently grants such power.
87 The American Medical Association approved the principle of the court-
appointed expert in 1926. See note 9 supra; McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE
§ 17 (1954); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940). The National
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only for cases where 'findings by neutral experts would enhance
the opportunity to clarify the issues and reach a just decision.
The first plans were applied only to areas of the law where expert
testimony was the key to the outcome of the dispute.8 8 More
recently, the idea has been incorporated into judicially admin-
istered plans affecting personal injury disputes.
(1) The Model Expert Testimony Act as adopted in South Da-
kota
In 1939, South Dakota adopted the proposal of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 9 The plan
provides for expert witnesses in all areas of specialized learning.
Court appointment of up to three experts may be made by the
judge in both civil and criminal cases on his own motion or upon
request after consultation with both parties. Parties share equal-
ly in the expense and both may call their own expert witnesses
and cross-examine the court-appointed expert.
This statewide plan is not often requested by counsel. Nor
is it frequently utilized by the circuit court judiciary, though
most judges report having used it several times in either crim-
inal, accounting, or personal injury disputes.90 All judges concur
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws did so in 1937 in
the form of the Uniform Expert Testimony Act, redesignated the Model
Expert Testimony.Act by the Conference in. 1943. NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF CoInMIssIoNERS ON UNIFotmV STATE LAws 337 (1937). The
Model Code of Evidence, American Law Institute, contains provisions
similar to those in the Model Expert Testimony Act. MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rules 403-10 (1942). The-American Bar Association, Section
on Judicial Administration, endorsed the New York Program in 1956.
See note 10 supra.
88 Of these, the best known is the "Briggs Law" of Massachusetts, enacted
in 1921, which subjects capital and repetitive noncapital offenders to
psychiatric examination by one or more physicians selected by an offi-
cial medical body. The reports have achieved such prestige that they
are usually automatically accepted by the prosecution and the defense.
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, §-100(A) (1957). See Overholser, The
History and Operation of the Briggs Law of Massachusetts, 2 LAw &
CoNTmwP. PROB. 436 (1935).
89 S.D. CODE §§ 36.0109-.018 (Supp. 1960). The Supreme Court rule,
adopted Sept. 12, 1942, effective Jan. 1, 1943, bears great resemblance
to FED. R. Civ. P. 35 in giving the judge wide latitude in his discretion
to call witnesses not called by either party. See also Sink, The Unused
Power of a Federal Judge To Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 So. CAL.
L. REV. 195 (1956).
90 Letters From Presiding Judge Frank Biegelmeier, South Dakota Su-
preme Court, and Circuit Judges Roy D. Burns, George A. Rice, Cyrus
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that the plan is desirable and serves a useful purpose. The fact
that the court has the power to call experts has a salutary psy-
chological effect on experts who are called by the parties. A cir-
cuit judge expresses the real benefit of the plan:
The provision of the statute permitting court-appointed experts is
a very good one although it is seldom used. It has a wholesome
effect upon other experts who are called to testify as they are
aware of the fact that the court has the power to call a disinter-
ested expert or experts. That knowledge will keep them from
coloring their opinions too much.91
(2) Advisory panels in nonjury compensation proceedings92
(a) The advisory panel to the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation
Court
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court maintained a
medical advisory board until the early 1940's. The board was
authorized by general statutory provisions empowering the court
to adopt all reasonable rules to carry out the intent and purposes
of the act. 3 The legislature granted the compensation court ex-
press approval to dispense with the common law and statutory
rules of evidence. The court could "upon their or its own mo-
tion, require the production of . . . any facts or matters which
may be necessary to assist in a determination of the rights of
either party . . . . 94 The panel of doctors enabled the court to
C. Puckett, Francis G. Dunn and Leslie R. Hersrud, Dec. 28, 1964,
through Jan. 4, 1965.
91 Letter From Judge Cyrus C. Puckett, First Judicial District, Circuit
Court of South Dakota, Dec. 31, 1964.
92 In a letter of Jan. 14, 1965, Visiting Professor J. Neville Turner of the
University of Nebraska College of Law, who has tried many cases
before English courts, explains that the British National Insurance Acts
utilize an administrative panel of experts appointed by the state in
determination of pensions for persons injured during employment.
However, circuit courts (above $1,100) presently countenance no such
procedure in personal injury trials. Due to the expense of trials, most
personal injury cases in England are tried not by a jury, but by ajudge sitting alone. "A judge is less likely than a jury to be enchanted
by a forensic battle, and indeed most barristers would feel that a dis-
play of disrespect for the medical profession would do no good to
either their client's cause or their own reputation. Nonetheless, there
is no doubt that where there is a conflict of medical testimony, no
barrister would hesitate to strongly cross-examine a witness ....
Almost invariably, the report of the insurance company's doctors is
more favorable to the defence than that of the client's experts."
93 NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-163 (Reissue 1960).
94 Ibid.
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investigate in such a manner as in its judgment was best cal-
culated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties.9 5
The board rendered an important service in advising the
court on difficult medical problems,96 but during the early
1940's it was discontinued. Nebraska attorneys who practiced at
the time now advance conflicting theories to explain the board's
disuse,97 and several recommend revival of the plan. Presiding
Judge Albert Arms reveals the real reason behind discontinua-
tion of the panel:
While we realize that such panels may be of some value in the
larger cities in jury cases, our experience has led us to the conclu-
sion that such panels would not be practical in Nebraska in com-
pensation cases .... A judge of this Court after several years
experience in hearing cases soon learns those doctors who go over-
board conservatively in favor of the defendant and those doctors
who are overly liberal in favor of their patients. We learn to give
the doctor's testimony the weight to which it is entitled, and gen-
erally speaking, we find that a specialist in a particular field will
be entitled to more credit than a general practitioner, who is
quite often the employee's family physician.98
A fair reading of this explanation indicates that the panel was
abolished not because it was undesirable but merely because it
was no longer considered necessary. Several years of experience
enables the judiciary to properly evaluate biased medical testi-
mony. Only a gradual learning process provides such discern-
ment.
However, Judge Arms explains further:
This court does have the authority to appoint a doctor. We
often do so in those disputed cases where there is a wide variance
95 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-168 (Reissue 1960). See Memorandum No. 8, Ne-
braska Workmen's Compensation Court, Oct. 21, 1941; DODD, ADiM-
ISTRATION OF WoRMvN'S COMPENSATION 460-64 (1936).
96 Hon. Larry E. Welch, Omaha Municipal Court, who served on the com-
pensation court from 1935-1941, relates that during his tenure the med-
ical advisory panel conducted an average of four examinations a week.
The benefit of the board was that "it gave the court an opportunity
to consult and receive professional education on difficult medical prob-
lems." Letter From Judge Larry E. Welch, Jan. 21, 1965.
97 A Lincoln attorney: "The difficulty was that in every case the court-
appointed expert decided the lawsuit .... I assume that our experi-
ence is a pretty accurate demonstration of what would happen in the
wider use of the court-appointed expert." But see Schmidt v. City of
Lincoln, 137 Neb. 546, 290 N.W. 250 (1940), which rejected the expert's
opinion, initially and on rehearing. A Lincoln attorney: "It was con-
sidered by plaintiffs to be too conservative."
98 Letter From Presiding Judge Albert Arms, Nebraska Workmen's Com-
pensation Court, Sept. 25, 1964.
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in the testimony of doctors which renders it almost impossible in
some cases for the court to make an intelligent finding.99
Despite its extensive experience in resolving disputes which turn
on medical testimony, the court often must resort to court-
appointed experts. A fortiori conflicting testimony will perplex
a jury in many cases, and a jury is not empowered to appoint its
own experts to clear up the uncertainty. It must sift for itself
the generally highly technical medical testimony and reach a con-
clusion without the help of the objective advice upon which the
compensation court relies. The experience of that court suggests
that a court-appointed panel would facilitate a jury's resolution of
medical disputes.
(b) The Utah Plan
In 1941, the Utah State Medical Association and the State
Industrial Commission collaborated to provide a panel to resolve
medical questions concerning all occupational disease cases, es-
pecially silicosis. In 1955, its provisions were extended to work-
men's compensation proceedings. 00 The industrial commission
pays for the services of the panel of three and any costs incident
to examination out of a fund financed by deposits made by em-
ployers on behalf of deceased workers who have left no depend-
ents. This fund has not been materially reduced, although the
commission has in some cases engaged experts from outside the
state and even outside the United States.
The panel's findings are influential but not conclusive. If
objections are filed to the panel's report, the commission is re-
quired to hold a hearing at which the objector may produce re-
buttal medical testimony. This seldom occurs, and the medical
examinations have aided in settlement of every case in which
they have been used. Labor, industry, insurance carriers, and the
commission strongly favor the program.101
99 Ibid.
100 Workmen's Compensation Law, UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-77 (Supp.
1963); Occupational Disease Law, UTAH CODE AxN. § 35-2-57 (Supp.
1963).
101 Letter From Otto A. Wiesley, Chairman of the Utah Industrial Com-
mission and Utah Labor Relations Board, Nov. 10, 1964. The Utah
Supreme Court has never reversed a case involving use of the panel.
"EXPERTS" IN MEDICAL TESTIMONY
(3) Panels appointed by medical societies for judicial use in
jury proceedings
(a) The New York Plan
The New York Plan became operative in New York County
in 1952 and in Bronx County two years later.10 2 It was originally
conceived by the New York trial justices under the leadership of
eminent judges, professors, and medical men. 03 Under the
plan, the court is empowered to call a neutral expert from a list
nominated by the local medical society. The expert examines the
plaintiff and the medical reports of both parties and then reports
his findings at pretrial hearing and, if necessary, at the trial.
The choice of doctors to serve on the panels is entrusted
solely to the medical profession itself. A special joint committee
of the New York Academy of Medicine and the New York County
Medical Society chooses the doctors according to two specified
requirements: acknowledged authority in the branch of medicine
involved and no previous identification with defendants or plain-
tiffs in personal injury litigation. 0 4 The committee listed eight-
een different panels and persuaded those chosen to serve. 0 5
102 N.Y. & BRONX COUNTIES SuP. CT. R. XI-12.
103 Presiding Justice David W. Peck, Supreme Court of New York, Ap-
pellatd Division, First Department; Professor Delmar Karlen, Research
Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration, Inc.; Dr. Irving
S. Wright, New York Hospital.
104 McNally, Impartial Medical Testimony Plan-Its Operation and Re-
sults, 1960 INs. L.J. 95.
105 AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY oF NEW YoRK, SPEcIAL Co1vvIrrTE
ON MEDIcAL EXPERT TEsTImoNY PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDIcAL TESTimONY
83 (1956), lists 18 categories in New York County:















Obstetrics and Gynecology 5
Genitourinary Diseases 4
Malignancy and Trauma 1
Endocrinology 2
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The judiciary alone selects the cases for reference to the
panel. If the medical reports of the parties differ widely in their
analysis of the injuries during pretrial conference, the judge may
consider a report by an impartial expert advisable. He then
submits to the Medical Report Office a reference form describing
the nature of the medical dispute and the type of specialist needed.
The judge and the attorneys know which specialties are available,
but not the names of the specialists. The clerk's files are con-
fidential and organized on a rotating basis to prevent prediction of
which name will next appear.
The attorneys then arrange with the clerk at the Medical
Report Office to have a panel doctor examine the plaintiff. The
parties must accept the first doctor on the list, unless he has been
a participant in the treatment of the particular litigant. The
parties then give their reports to the clerk, who is allowed to sub-
poena hospital records. In each case, the report of the expert's
examination is sent in triplicate to the Medical Report Office to be
distributed to the judge and the lawyers.
At a subsequent pretrial conference, the judge and attorneys
discuss the case again in light of the new report. If settlement is
not reached, either party or the judge may call the panel expert to
testify. If he is called, the jury is told that he was appointed by
the court. Either party may cross-examine him.
The Sloan and Ford Foundations financed the plan during
its initial two years. Subsequently, the costs of the plan have be-
come a regular part of the county budget. New York County
annually appropriates $15,000 for that purpose. The panel ex-
perts are requested to make the same charge for services as
they would to a private patient of moderate means. 10 6
Most commentators consider the New York Plan successful. 0 7
In 1956, a special committee of the New York City Bar Associa-
tion released the following report on the accomplishments of the
plan:
1. The Project has improved the process of finding medical facts
in litigated cases.
106 For a detailed explanation of its organization and operation, see N.Y.
JUDICIAL CONFERENcE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 94, at 113 (1959).
107 Barr, Medical Testimony: Doctors and Lawyers Cooperate, 41 J. AM.
JuD. Soc'y 78 (1957); Frankel, The Use of Disinterested Medical Testi-
mony, 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 93 (1958); Martin, Impartial Medical Testi-
mony Project, 28 INS. COUNSEL J. 612 (1961); Zeisel, Book Review, 8
STAN. L. REV. 730 (1956).
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2. It has helped to relieve court congestion.
3. It has had a wholesome prophylactic effect upon the formula-
tion and presentation of medical testimony in court.
4. It has proved that the modest expenditure involved effects a
large saving and economy in court operations.
5. It has pointed the way to better diagnosis in the field of trau-
matic medicine. Unlike the others listed above, this accom-
plishment is an unexpected dividend, which was not in con-
templation when the Project was initiated.
In addition, the Project has provided an excellent, but all too
rare, example of successful interprofessional cooperation. Doctors
and lawyers, instead of bickering fruitlessly or merely talking
about the need for cooperation, have worked together effectively
in solving a common problem. And judges, instead of holding
themselves aloof, have participated fully in the enterprise. The
result has been better understanding among judges, lawyers and
doctors, and mutual help. It is not too much to expect that the
long-range effect will be increased public respect for both pro-
fessions and increased public confidence in the administration ofjustice.108
The results over the last decade corroborate this earlier report.
The most recent comprehensive tabulation mirrors the New York




Item County County Total
1. Case Referrals To Date 828 579 1407
Preference Referrals To Date 44 95 139
872 674 1546
2. Resumed Conferences Pending 18 5 23
3. Cases Passed Upon At
Resumed Conferences 699 405 1104
4. Cases Settled 595 422 1017
5. Transferred To Lower Court 17 10 27
6. Cases Tried 162 101 263
7. Cases In Which Examinations
Were Held 836 641 1477
8. Cases In Which Examinations
Are To Be Held 3 13 16
9. Cases Disposed Of Without
Examinations 33 20 53
108 SPEcLL COMmIT=E, op. cit. supra note 105, at 5.
109 Letter From Leland Tolman, Director of Administration of the Courts,
First Judicial Department, New York, and Carl Graziano, Administra-
tive Assistant, Nov. 9, 1964.
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TABLE B
(References to the Medical Report Office Jan. 1, 1964 to June 30, 1964.)
New York Bronx
Item County County Total
1. Pretrial 25 12 37
2. Trial Term 16 41 57
3. Preferences 0 10 10
4. Others 1 1 2
Totals 42 64 106
TABLE C
(References to Specialists on the Panel, Jan. 1, 1964 to June 30, 1964.
Cases are sometimes required to go to more than one specialist.)
New York Bronx
Item County County Total
General Surgery 0 0 0
Plastic Surgery 0 0 0
Ophthalmology 4 3 7
Cardiovascular 2 5 8
Dermatology 0 0 0
Tuberculosis 0 1 1
Internal Medicine 0 0 0
Neurosurgery 10 6 16
Neurology 1 3 4
Psychiatry 0 0 0
Neuropsychiatry 5 4 9
Roentgenology 1 3 4
Orthopedics 12 32 43
Otolaryngology 3 3 6
Genitourinary 1 0 1
Obstetrics & Gynecology 0 1 1
Endocrinology 0 0 0
Allergy 1 0 1
General Dentistry 1 1 1
Tropical Medicine 0 0 0
Totals 41 62 102
Use of the panel has reportedly effected settlement in about
seventy per cent of the cases in which it was used in the first de-
partment.110 It is true that the percentage of the cases referred to
the medical office and ultimately tried to verdict is higher than is
the percentage of all cases filed that go to verdict (usually be-
tween seven and ten per cent), but this does not detract from the
significance of the settlement figures in cases that are referred.
It must be remembered that these are the hard core, the most
resistant to settlement, and the most persistent of all the cases on
the calendar. When this fact is considered, the percentage which
110 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 90, at 169 (1964).
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went to trial is remarkably low.
Financing of the project has saved the public more than it has
cost. The special report originally estimated savings of $2,250 for
each trial; settlements have saved more than ten times the total
amount spent for fees."' These figures take into account neither
trial days saved through settlements during trial nor public sav-
ings effected through cutting down excessive claims against the
city of New York, one of the major litigants in the court. The
justices and the appropriating authorities estimate that, assuming
very conservatively that cases settled would each take three trial
days, the project saves substantially more than its cost." 2
One very important feature of the plan is the provision
which permits, but does not require, the trial justice or either
party to call upon the medical expert to testify at the trial.
This serves three primary ends. First, it provides for the judge
and jury an impartial, expert, and informed factual basis for the
formulation of final judgment on the extent of damages, thus aid-
ing them to some extent in the difficult, technical job of recon-
ciling conflicting expert opinions given by the partisan doctors for
the opposing parties. Second, the very existence of the right,
even though it is not exercised, has been responsible for many in-
tangible and statistically immeasurable benefits. It serves to re-
strain partisan experts from presenting reports or, at the trial,
misleading findings which they know or think can be publicly ex-
posed on the witness stand by a respected member of the medical
profession. Finally, the procedure is an intangible force for pre-
trial settlement of the case. The plaintiff with an inflated claim
or the defendant who denies all or any substantial damage when
it clearly exists to some degree will be more truthful and reason-
able at pretrial, if he has in his hands a neutral report on the in-
juries made by a highly respected practitioner chosen by the court
on recommendation of responsible leaders of the medical profes-
sion, who, he knows, will testify at the trial. If this were not the
understanding at pretrial, the value of the impartial expert
would be greatly reduced."13
Based on this experience, it is the recent consensus among the
judges of the first department that it would be in the interest
of justice to extend the plan to those counties in New York
"I SPECIAL Commr1nTT, op. cit. supra note 105, at 35.
112 ALLEGHENY COUNTY (PA.) MEDICAL SocIETY, MEDICAL-LEGAL COwmITTE,
RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION INTO IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY PLANS
15 (1961).
11" N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 94, at 7 (1959).
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where such a medical panel is feasible.114 The basic idea of the
New York Plan has spread to several other jurisdictions during
the last decade.115
(b) The Baltimore Plan"16
Baltimore adopted an analogous plan in 1955 under the aegis
of Emory H. Niles, Chief Judge of the Supreme Bench of Balti-
more. It differs from the New York Plan in four respects. First,
the names of the doctors on the twenty-one panels (each panel
consisting of three doctors) are neither kept secret nor published.
Second, the plan is set in motion only upon request by a party.
Third, a party's objection to any doctor named may motivate the
judge, in his discretion, to replace that doctor with another.
Finally, the cost is not borne by the public, but usually by the
litigant calling the expert witness. The final word on use of the
plan is left to the discretion of the judge. To encourage impar-
tiality, the witness is not told which party is responsible for his
appearance.
Initially, the plan was seldom employed. Its effectiveness has
been limited because appointment of the impartial expert is de-
pendent upon request by one of the litigants and upon the judge's
discretion. Some of the judges have never used it. During the
last few years, it has been helpful in aiding the medical fact-
finding process, though its use has not increased substantially.
1 17
(c) The Philadelphia Plan"18
Through cooperation of the judges of the United States Dis-
trict Court and the Pennsylvania Medical Society, 119 the "Phila-
114 N.Y. JUDIcIAL CoNFERENcE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 91, at 90 (1963).
115 For references to sources outlining the spread of the idea throughout
the United States, see KLEIN, JUDIcIAL ADmINISTRATION AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 393 (1963).
116 BALTnIORE SUPER. CT. GEN. R. PRAc. & P. 5-1 was devised in 1954 by
a joint committee of the Maryland and Baltimore City Bar Associations
and the State Medical Society.
117 Letter From Judge Emory H. Niles, Jan. 21, 1965. Judge Niles also
emphasizes that the petition for use of the expert and the subsequent
payment of the fee (never more than $100.00) has been used most
extensively by the defendant insurance companies. Plaintiffs do not
utilize the procedure at all.
118 U.S. DIST. CT. (E.D. Pa.) LocAL R. 22.
119 The medical society asked 170 experts to participate in this plan and
169 of them agreed to do so. MEDIcAL-LEGAL CoMMnTE, op. cit. supra
note 112, at 4.
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delphia Federal" Plan became operative in 1958. Two features
differ from the New York Plan. First, if there is objection to the
first expert on the panel list, the doctor following him may be
offered as an alternative. If counsel do not agree on the second
expert, the judge then designates one of the two. Second, the
doctor's fee is paid equally by the parties. 120
A report for the period ending September 8, 1964, regarding
the 111 cases where applications have been made, reveals propiti-
ous results: 121
1. Motion for appointment of doctor denied 9
2. Settled prior to appointment from the panel (The motion
was denied in 6 cases due to delay in filing and the im-
minence of trial; the cases were subsequently settled.) 13
3. Case tried to verdict (In 15 of these, the verdict was
consistent with the report of the neutral doctor; in the
other 9, the jury's verdict was not consistent with the neu-
tral doctor's report.) 24
4. Case submitted to jury (In 2 cases, the jury could not
agree; the other 2 were settled during trial and juries
were withdrawn.) 4
5. Case tried to verdict on the issue of damages (In 17
cases, there were plaintiff's verdicts; in 5 there were de-
fendant's verdicts.) 22
6. Settlement reached after receipt of doctor's report (45 did
not go to trial; 8 were settled during trial.) 53
7. Examination suggested by court rather than on motion by
either party 4
8. Miscellaneous 4
9. Reports received and settlement discussions pending 2
Though the effect on court congestion has been negligible, the
plan has been a substantial success in medical factfinding, medi-
cal testimony, and promotion of better understanding between the
professions.12
2
120 See generally Comment, 32 Tmvn'. L.Q. 193, 200 (1959).
.21 Letter From Judge Joseph S. Lord, MI, United States District Court
(E.D. Pa.), Nov. 17, 1964. The writer expresses gratitude to Judge
Lord who, though not personally a proponent of the plan [see Lord,
Book Review, 29 TEmp. L.Q. 473 (1956)], nevertheless expressed the
opinion that the majority of the federal judges are satisfied with the
progress of the Philadelphia Plan.
122 Van Dusen, A United States District Judge's View of the Impartial
Medical Expert System, 32 F.R.D. 498 (1962).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 44, No. 3
(d) The Chicago Plan12
The United States District Court judges in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois adopted a plan in 1959 virtually identical to the
"Philadelphia Federal" Plan. The sole distinction is that the judge
decides whether payment is to be made by one or both of the
parties.
It is especially significant to note that the Illinois Supreme
Court adopted the plan in 1961, providing for court-appointment
of medical experts in the state courts. The Illinois State Medical
Society is cooperating by establishing panels of experts to serve
those courts, by reviewing the membership yearly, and by in-
quiring into the quality of the examinations, reports, and testi-
mony of the panel members. In 1962, the State Medical Society,
deeming impartial medical testimony "an important public serv-
ice," established a $5,000 fund for the payment of panel mem-
bers. It now intends to appropriate another $5,000.124
The plan was utilized sixty-seven times during its first two
years and eighteen times in 1964.125 The Illinois State Medical
Society is now collecting data, and indications are that their
report will prove the plan is serving a useful purpose. The judges
are unanimous in their enthusiasm for the plan.
(e) The Los Angeles Plan126
This plan gives wide latitude to judicial discretion. First, the
judge or either party may request examination by the neutral
expert, but final decision in the matter is left to the judge.
Second, if counsel for either party objects to the assignment of
the expert, he is passed over and subsequent panel experts are
considered until agreement is reached. At the trial, the judge
again has discretion in allowing the expert to be called by the
party originally requesting him. The plan originally prohibited
123 U.S. DIST. CT. (N.D. Ill.) LOCAL R. 20, through cooperation of the
Illinois State Medical Society and the Chicago Medical Society in con-junction with the federal judiciary. The superior and circuit courts
of Illinois also adopted the plan. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 17-2.
124 MEDICAL-LEGAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 11.
125 Letter From Robert P. Steine, Chief Deputy Clerk, United States Dis-
trict Court (N.D. Ill.), Jan. 20, 1965.
126 Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 26, endorsed under CAL. Civ. PRoc.
CODE § 1871. The plan was established through cooperation of the
Los Angeles County Medical Association and a committee of superior
court justices.
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the expert's court-appointment from being disclosed to the jury,
unless counsel attempted "to impeach him by showing bias or
prejudice." The rule was changed to allow disclosure of his court-
appointment in all cases. Furthermore, he may be cross-examined
by both sides or by the judge. Finally, the litigant originally
requesting appointment pays all fees, unless the judge determines
that the litigant is unable to pay, in which case county funds are
used. The fee charged by the expert must conform to the scale
established by the California Industrial Accident Commission.127
Originally, the plan contained a unique and rather limiting
feature providing that every case involving requests for the court-
appointed expert had to be transferred to the chief judge for
handling. This apparently is no longer the rule. The plan is
credited with having stimulated settlement in numerous cases
where the judge indicated that impartial examinations appeared
to be needed. Judge Reginald I. Bouder states that during the
first two years not a single case involving appointment went to
trial.1 28 Presiding Judge Kenneth N. Chantry reports that the
plan is currently receiving extensive use, though no statistics are
available.129
(f) The Cleveland Plan3 0
Under this plan, adopted in 1959, the judge invokes the panel
only if the parties so agree. A panel of three experts conducts
examinations at the request of the pretrial judge. Compensa-
t.ion is based upon a fee schedule established by the Academy of
Medicine with court approval. 'A unique feature requires the
parties' written stipulation that, if the case is tried, neither will
mention that court-appointed experts participated duri'ng the
pretrial period. This is the only operating plan which forbids
identification of the court-appointed expert if he is called to
testify.
127 M-EDICAL-LEG.AL Co Mrr=vm, op. cit. supra note 112, at 9.
128 Id. at 13.
129 Letter From Presiding Judge Kenneth N. Chantry, Superior Court,
Los Angeles, California, Nov. 27, 1964, explains that the superior
court is the largest court of its kind. No statistics on the use of court-
appointed experts have been kept because "it is obvious that it would
require a monumental task, involving examination, investigation and
study of thousands of cases tried over a period of five years, to attempt
to ascertain and compile such statistics."
130 CUYAHOGA CoUNTY CT. C.P. R. 21(A), 21(B), established in coopera-
tion with the Cleveland Academy of Medicine.
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Results point to the weakness of the plan. More than a year
after operation commenced, only four orders of the court had
been issued.' 3 ' The plan is now a controversial issue among
lawyers and doctors in Cleveland. No requests for court-ap-
pointed experts have been made in over a year, and the plan has
apparently fallen into desuetude. 132 Restriction to pretrial use, by
refusal to identify panel members as such to the trial jury, has
seriously limited the plan's effectiveness. In addition, the use of
three independent examinations and the requirement that counsel
for both parties consent to use of the plan have proven cumber-
some.
(g) The Pittsburgh Plan133
Since 1962, a plan virtually identical to the "Philadelphia
Federal" Plan has operated in both the federal and state courts
in the Pittsburgh area. It was activated after intensive research
by the Medical-Legal Committee of the Allegheny County Medi-
cal Society. In over two years of operation, twenty-eight cases
have been referred to the medical society's panel. Though no
further statistics have as yet been compiled, recent reports indi-
cate that the doctors have been most cooperative in serving on
the panels, and the courts are well satisfied with its success in
promoting settlements.134
(h) Summary of plans presently existing
Several observations are evident upon close examination of
the court-appointed expert plans.135  The plans are used in a
relatively small number of the total cases processed by a court.
However, they are applied to those "hard core" cases which
otherwise offer the least hope of settlement. These are the cases
which would otherwise consume much of the time and resources
of the courts.
Ideally, all cases in which medical testimony is widely diver-
gent should be identified in the pretrial stage, and impartial ex-
131 The Cleveland Press, Nov. 30, 1960.
132 Letter From Chief Justice Arthur Day, Court of Common Pleas of
Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Jan. 21, 1965.
133 U.S. DIST. CT. (W.D. Pa.) LocAl. R. 5-I1. The same rule was adopted
by the Court of Common Pleas of Pittsburgh, in both instances through
cooperation with the Allegheny Medical Society.
134 Letter From Frederic W. Fagler, Executive Secretary of the Allegheny
County Medical Society, Nov. 13, 1964.
135 MEDIcAL-LEGAL CommrI EE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 13.
"EXPERTS" IN MEDICAL TESTIMONY
amination ordered promptly. Remarkable proof of the effective-
ness of the plans is seen, however, in the substantial number of
cases which have been settled after impartial examinations had
been requested at a later point in the proceedings. The New
York figures, for example, substantiate this proposition.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the plans is their in-
tangible effect on cases where they are not used. The influence
of the plans may well lead to less divergence in the medical con-
tentions of the parties. More reasonable medical conclusions are
encouraged by the knowledge that a neutral factfinding appara-
tus is available.
The plans have generated great enthusiasm in the medical
profession in most jurisdictions. Support and cooperation have
been most evident in those most directly involved with the opera-
tion of the plans. An active interest has been stimulated in other
jurisdictions presently considering adoption of impartial medical
testimony projects. 18 6
V. THE CASE AGAINST THE COURT-APPOINTED
EXPERT SYSTEM
The three arguments against the plan may be summarized as
follows: (1) certain types of medical conflicts are currently
beyond a reasonably certain medical resolution; (2) a totally
qualified and impartial expert is inherently unattainable; and
(3) the panel system subverts the adversary system through ju-
dicial embroilment in the controversy and through conditioning
the jury to uncritical acceptance of the expert's opinion as medi-
cal fact.
A. CERTAIN TYPES OF MEDIcAL CONFLICTS ARE CURRENTLY
BEYOND A REASONABLY CERTAIN MEDICAL RESOLuTION
This argument premises that medicine is not an exact science.
Many areas in medicine contain internal divisions of opinion
136 San Francisco, Minneapolis, and the State of Wisconsin have either
initiated or are presently considering such a plan. See Comment, 47
MARQ. L. REv. 522 (1964), which was specifically prepared for the Judi-
cial Council of the State of Wisconsin at the request of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. The superior and county courts in Essex, Morris,
Union, and Warren Counties, New Jersey, adopted a plan in 1961 on
an experimental basis. N.J. Sup. CT. NEw PRAc. R. 4:25 A-1 to 4:25A-114, effective September 11, 1961. Recent reports indicate that plans
are also being considered in Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, and the District of Columbia.
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where "schools of thought" and different evaluation techniques
make honest differences of opinion a normal state of affairs.1'3
The finest specialists are unable to bridge these schisms with
reasonable medical certainty. In this regard, an Omaha defense
attorney remarks:
Where there is an honest dispute between doctors, an impartial
doctor would not be of considerable help. As a practical matter,
I wonder if it would not result in having two against one rather
than one against one so far as medical testimony is concerned.
An outstate attorney observes: "The administration of justice
would not be improved by the possibility of adding still a third
opinion and thus injecting an extraneous issue into the litigation."
A Grand Island attorney warns: "Assuming the parties call
their own medical witnesses, adding the uncertainty of panel testi-
mony would only add to the total confusion of the conflicting
medical testimony." A Lincoln attorney forecasts the ensuing
situation:
Parties would continue the practice of getting independent evalu-
ation, producing their own experts and attempting to prevail
against the court-appointed expert. In other words, the battle of
the expert with the spectacle of knowledgeable people substan-
tially varying in their opinions and evaluation would nonetheless
continue.
Many fear that positive harm would result from introducing
the court-appointed expert on the grounds that the case would
then be judged by the fortuitous circumstance of his. particular
predilection to one school or technique. A doctor's individual
background and all of his education, training, and experience have
contributed to his total concept of medicine. They have made
him "partial" toward personal conclusions and theories which
differ in varying degrees from those of other doctors. An Omaha
plaintiff's lawyer states:
The evaluation technique of many doctors, especially on partial-
permanent disability questions, is sincere but highly divergent.
• .. If the examination were, by the luck of the draw, conducted
by a doctor whose evaluations tend to be highly liberal, the de-
fense would be extremely unhappy. In the reverse situation, the
plaintiff's attorney would be unhappy.
Chief Justice White capsules the ultimate objection:
Bias, prejudice and personal philosophy about the elements of
pain and suffering would enter into the picture of appointment
of the expert. Bitterness would be apt to develop. Lawyers
would be producing experts battling two adversaries.138
137 Botein, Impartial Medical Testimony, 328 Annals 75 (1960).
138 Letter From Chief Justice Paul W. White, Nebraska Supreme Court,
Nov. 21, 1964. A western Nebraska judge cites an example: "The
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The counterargument first emphasizes the New York and
Chicago experiences, where cases involving "schools of thought"
are hardly numerous. 39 Furthermore, this criticism of panel
testimony in areas where the medical profession is not in unani-
mity assumes too much. Proponents of the argument think in
terms of two evenly balanced schools of thought, instances of
which are in actuality few and far between. For example, the
overwhelming weight of competent medical authority disdains the
view that cancer can be caused by a single blow. 40 No knowl-
edgeable expert in this field now holds the view that such acci-
dents either do or can cause a malignant tumor, yet there is an
"opposite school" of thought. To ban the court-appointed expert
from the legal arena here deprives the fact finder of an objective
explanation of what modern medical thought on this particular
medical subject really is. Such gross exaggerations and distortions
are not unusual in modern courtrooms, and yet the lawyer seeking
to establish his 100 to 1 shot will cry aloud that it is wrong to
appoint an impartial expert because he might belong to the "op-
posite school." In these situations, the two-school argument is
the "brain-child of lawyer-advocates" and has no sound basis in
competent medical thought.'4 ' Use of the court-appointed expert
here would clip the wings of clever advocacy.
panel's opinion would not necessarily be more sound, since honest
differences of opinion can and do occur. Recently an orthopedist men-
tioned in testimony that in the course of an exploratory operation to
ascertain whether a disc was herniated, he and his consultant disagreed
as to whether the disc was actually herniated. A panel's conclusion
certainly would not be better. If both parties happened to disagree
with the panel's conclusions and were permitted to cross-examine and
to contradict, there would then be much more lengthy cross-examina-
tion and three sets of experts."
189 MEDICAL-LEGAL Cown rnTE, op .'cit. supra note 112, at 17.
140 Griffin, Impartial Medical Testimony: A Trial Lawyer in Favor, 34
TEmp. L.Q. 402 (1961).
141 Id. at 408 n.6. The author cites outlandish examples where counsel
has sought to correlate accidents and disability: "In addition to cases
involving strict mechanical injuries, the writer has taken part in trials
where accidents were said to have caused hypothyroidism, hyperthy-
roidism, pulmonary emphysema, diabetes, cancer of the liver, cancer
of the rectum, lung cancer, coronary occlusion, myocardial infarct,
emboli lodged in internal auditory artery, hernia, epilepsy, impotence,
alcoholism, atrophy of brain and spinal cord, schizophrenia, paranoia,
peptic ulcer, aneurysm of Circle of Willis, dermatitis, hypertension, and
illitis, to say nothing of those common personality disorders seen daily
in court, anxiety neurosis and conversion hysteria. If proof of causa-
tion is seemingly impossible, there is always aggravation."
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In areas of legitimately differing evaluation techniques, where
the variances are not gaping, the judge can always screen the
use of court-appointed experts.142  However, if appointment
should occur in cases where there is room for disagreement, the
panel expert would undoubtedly be the first to testify that dif-
fering schools or techniques legitimately exist, to state the one to
which he subscribes, and to explain the other. There is no reason
why opposing counsel cannot ask the panel expert to explain the
controversy involved, thus bringing genuine disagreement to the
attention of the jury. 43 Finally, as an Omaha attorney suggests,
the right of panel members to file "minority reports" would
certainly identify the area as one open to authentic dispute.
B. A TOTALLY QUALIFIED AND IMPARTIAL EXPERT
IS INHERENTLY UNATTAINABLE
This argument suggests that even the most scrupulously ob-
jective physician might be wrong. In addition to the "he-might-
be-wrong" approach, the very nature of the plan makes it un-
likely that an opinion will be based on all the facts, since the
court-appointed expert will not be brought into the picture until
several months after the injury. A Lincoln attorney states:
"Many injuries take some time to materialize and a 'one shot'
examination of the patient would in many cases not enable the
expert panel to arrive at a fair and just determination." An
Omaha attorney points out:
[T]he treating physician has wider knowledge of the patient's
background and a better realization of the effect of the injury on
his patient. A panel necessarily would not have the realistic
day to day contact that the attending physician has with pain and
suffering.
A Lincoln attorney states:
A court-appointed expert would probably not have the advantage
of observing the patient until an advanced stage of litigation.
This would entail the problem that a court-appointed doctor may
142 Steuer, The Judge Looks at the Impartial Doctor, 26 POSTGRADUATE
AIEDinciN A-52 (Supp. 1959), in MEDIcAL-LEGAL COMm-TTEE, op. cit.
supra note 112. The report notes a remark by Justice Steuer of New
York to the effect that, if he realized in advance there were two schools
of thought regarding the alleged injuries in a case, he would not call
an impartial expert, since he is not interested in a discussion of the
philosophy of basic medical problems.
143 An Omaha physician notes that, even in difficult areas, such as whip-
lash, the panel would produce additional clarity. "Such a panel would
help to distinguish between cases that have merit and those that do
not."
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not be able to make a fair evaluation in certain cases, not having
the benefit of early observation of the injured party.
The counterargument replies that the mere fact that a panel
expert might be wrong does not itself prove anything. We are
dealing with expediency, not absolute certainty. As F. Hastings
Griffin, Jr., states:
If the proponents of this approach were able to support either
the proposition that an impartial will more often be wrong than
right or the proposition that juries without impartials to help
them have a better chance of deciding correctly than juries with
impartials, then they would have something. But this writer has
not seen anyone make a real try to support either of those
propositions. 44
The reply to the argument that examination would be delayed
until after pretrial merely emphasizes the fact that present de-
fense examinations are often delayed so that the physician has no
opportunity to measure pain and suffering. On balance, this is
not a strong argument against the use of impartial panels, for
there is no reason that the original attending physician cannot be
called to fill in this information.
Even more basic, however, is the contention that "impartial-
ity" is unobtainable. 145 A Lincoln orthopedist expresses the ar-
gument:
Theoretically an unbiased pontification should bring about a
quick and proper solution to this problem. However, this is
probably as mythical as the concept of "justice" itself. It is im-
possible to get a completely unbiased opinion. In fact, it has been
said with considerable wisdom that an unbiased opinion isn't
worth very much. By the very nature of the criteria for choosing
the panel, a bias is introduced into the system. The proposed
medical experts would all be taken from a certain stratum of
society. They would almost undoubtedly come from the well-to-
do. If they were private practitioners, they might be conservative
in philosophy and be inclined to favor an insurance company over
a plaintiff. They conceivably might be biased against the con-
cept of "liability without fault." If the proposed expert witness
were taken from the staff of a medical school he might be more
liberal and possibly more inclined to favor a plaintiff rather
than an insurance company. I may exaggerate, but these biases
will be present to a greater or lesser degree in each person ac-
cording to his personal orientation. These biases may also in-
crease after a period of service by court-appointment.
144 Griffin, supra note 140, at 407.
145 Berry, Impartial Medical Testimony, 35 OKLA. B.J. 561 (1964): "[T]he
ideal result being sought in the plan is utterly unobtainable. That im-
partial Utopian individual, from whose person and position must come
this Impartial Medical Testimony, does not-may not-absolutely can-
not-exist. There simply ain't no such animal!"
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A Lincoln attorney emphasizes that "no matter how theoretically
independent the expert may be, he is always influenced by his
own prejudice, predilection and peculiar background." The stigma
of partisanship would remain because, as an Omaha attorney
states, "it is impossible to take the human element out of human
affairs."
The blade conceivably could cut both ways-liberally for plain-
tiffs, or conservatively for defendants. A Scottsbluff attorney
asserts the former:
[A]pparently unconsciously, doctors often are influenced by their
impression of the man they are examining wholly aside from the
objective symptoms they may find. If they like the patient, they
will give more weight to his subjective symptoms than if not.
Others object that a conservative bias would develop. A Kearney
attorney feels: "The panel of doctors would in all probability be
conditioned to be conservative and defense minded by virtue of
long standing procedures of insurance companies in defense of
claims." A Norfolk attorney fears a "snap, indifferent attitude"
on the part of the panel. An Omaha attorney elaborates:
It should be kept in mind that any panel of doctors [summoned]
by the court would undoubtedly include physicians and surgeons
on direct retainers with the large corporations such as the rail-
roads, utility companies, etc., and who in the main would also be
examiners for the life insurance companies. Under these condi-
tions I doubt very much whether you could find very many
people who would be willing to feel confident that they would
obtain an unprejudiced opinion even though the examiner might
feel that he "puts forth every effort to do so."
Even if an expert panel were initially impartial, many appre-
hend adverse long run tendencies. A Lincoln attorney warns
that continuous examinations would tend "to harden the panel
and after a while they would tend to minimize the extent of the
injury due to the nature of their work. '146 An Omaha attorney
predicts:
From my experience I doubt that a panel of physicians could,
after receiving the volume of cases now flowing through our
courts, remain completely neutral. My real feeling is that a panel
of such experts would initially favor a plaintiff in a personal in-
jury action. However, I am positive that after a flood of matters
was submitted to them, they would soon find themselves feeling
146 A Plattsmouth attorney: "Doctors, and I think lawyers as well, get
what I call 'case hardened' and deal with so many cases of one type
that the human element is lost. A broken leg becomes so common that
it is looked upon with such casualness as a 'simple fracture.' Medicine,
although advanced, is prone to label as malingering anything that can-
not be diagnosed."
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that everyone was litigation-minded and perhaps, even unknow-
ingly, become partial to the defendants .... It might work
initially, but over a long haul would not prove satisfactory from
either litigant's point of view.
A Scottsbluff attorney warns against the obstacle faced by doctors
who have been conditioned by court appearances:
I do not believe doctors can obtain a dispassionate view of these
matters or a judicial attitude overnight. We see lawyers who
become judges take a long time to get a true judicial attitude
and give up their approach as an advocate .... The difference
between the mental attitude of an advocate and a Judge is neces-
sary, but hard to obtain. A doctor who does not do this regu-
larly would probably continue to have an advocate's approach.
The counterargument first directs attention to the empirical
results of the New York and Philadelphia plans.14 7 Panel testi-
mony has certainly not proved to be a one-way street favoring
either side of the counsel table. The court-appointed expert has
often discovered injuries not seen by the attending physician
which have helped to increase the verdict. Secondly, even if the
argument is taken at face value, "it is irrelevant to the issues in
this discussion. Impartiality, within the meaning of the plan, is
complete lack of identification with the parties in a lawsuit.' 148
If the impartial medical expert meets this test and is of the caliber
that he must be to become a member of a panel, his examination,
report, and testimony will serve the purpose intended in the plan.
In other words, the conscious bias stemming from selection
by and financial attachment to one party is completely elimi-
nated. The fact that unconscious or built-in bias cannot neces-
sarily be eliminated is of no great concern. Safeguards can easily
be instituted to guard against undue influence from doctors pre-
viously identified with one side. Several Omaha lawyers suggest
that to mitigate the likelihood of drawing a doctor with an honest
bias, the panel might be selected from a list of five or seven, each
party having the right to strike a certain number. This would
resemble a voir dire for the panel members.
A professor at the University of Nebraska College of Law
summarizes in one sentence the basic strength of the counter-
argument: "[O]n balance it would be an improvement." The
problem here is not whether the court-appointed panel system
will produce absolute justice. Nothing yet devised will do that.
"The problem . . . is whether the plan will improve the chances
'47 See tables in text accompanying notes 108 & 121 supra.
148 MEDicA-LEAL Co V rmnE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 17.
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of reaching correct and therefore just findings of fact on medical
questions. To state the problem is to answer it.'
49
C. THE PANEL SYSTEM SUBVERTS THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM THROUGH
JuDICiAL EMBROILMENT IN THE CONTROVERSY AND THROUGH CON-
DITIONING THE JURY TO UNCRITIcAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXPERT'S
OPINION AS MEDIcAL FACT
The judicial role of nonadvocacy is a deep-rooted tradition.
In this regard, the argument is occasionally advanced that the
panel system pulls the judiciary into the adversary arena in that
the judge, having selected a witness, becomes "interested" in the
case and, therefore, is no longer qualified to impartially conduct
the proceedings.
This argument simply does not square with the operative facts.
Departure from the concept of judicial detachment does not occur,
because the judge himself does not select the panel member. 150
The judge merely calls upon the medical society to furnish an
expert in the medical specialty involved. Under a confidential
system, the judge knows neither the identity of the panel member
in advance of his request nor the details of the expert's qualifi-
cations, until he receives the report or accepts the testimony. 15 '
The gravest objections to the panel system have been offered
by those who fear for the integrity of our adversary system of
deciding ultimate issues of fact. One aspect of this fear is the
possibility that the jury will look upon the court-appointed ex-
pert as wearing a cloak of infallibility and will blindly accept his
opinion as the ultimate medical fact. An Omaha plaintiff's at-
torney states the argument:
It is the duty and obligation of the bar as well as the bench of
this country to safeguard zealously the preservation of the right
of trial by jury and to be acutely aware as to any move which
would ultimately make inroads upon the jury's prerogative of de-
ciding the fact issues in every case .... The appointment of a
medical expert or panel would result in emphasis being placed
upon the expert's court-appointed status to a point that would
virtually make the court-appointed doctors the fact judges of
medical issues.
An outstate attorney asserts: "This is tantamount to making the
judicially designated expert the sole judge of the issue in con-
149 Griffin, supra note 140, at 406.
150 Polsky, Expert Testimony: Problems in Jurisprudence, 34 TEMP. L.Q.
357, 364 (1961).
151 MEDiICAT-LEGAL COMMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 20.
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troversy and taking the administration of justice and the trial of
cases out of the hands of lawyers and placing it within the medi-
cal profession." His testimony will "exude an almost ineradicable
odor of sanctity.' 52 The editor of NACCA Law Journal quoted
with approval the appraisal of a leading authority: "[I]t is un-
fair to pin a badge of honor on one witness as having the
full confidence of the court, and withholding it from another,
patently labelling him as undeserving of confidence.' 53 A legal
educator criticizes the procedure as an attempt to equate cer-
tainty and competency with truth:
The authority role of the expert witness who has been identi-
fied to jurors as a member of a judicially selected impartial medi-
cal expert panel, has been substantially enlarged. In the context
of the courtroom setting, such identification may too readily be
taken to mean judicial certification on two counts: (a) profes-
sional ability as determined by judicial examination, and (b)
strict impartiality of the witness.154
Chief Justice White articulates the crucial distinction:
We are trying to adapt into the adversary system one of the de-
vices that is many times an integral part of decision by adminis-
trative boards. Close cooperation and consultation between the
experts on administrative boards in reaching a joint decision is
probably an important thing when this method for determination
of controversies is used. This will be either entirely or partially
absent under an expert appointed system. We are dealing here
with judicial procedure in which it is fundamental that the ad-
versary system should have full play.155
In a broader context, critics claim that the expert's usurpation
of the jury's prerogative is a dangerous step toward erosion of the
152 Lord, Book Review, 29 TEIp. L.Q. 472, 474 (1956).
153 Lambert, Impartial Medical Testimony: A New Audit, 20 NACCA L.J.
25, 28 (1957). NACCA, which changed its name to American Trial
Lawyers Association at the 1964 fall convention, is the only notable
organized group to oppose the panel systems. In appraising this opposi-
tion, see SHnATEI & PLANT, THE LAw OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 339 (1959):
"[O]ne should bear in mind two things: (a) The NACCA group repre-
sents the plaintiffs' and claimants' point of view, and (b) juries tend
to favor plaintiffs rather than defendants and any rule or law or pro-
cedure which curbs the free rein of the jury will always be opposed
by the representatives of the plaintiff's side of the table."
'54 Polsky, supra note 150, at 362. See also Levy, Impartial Medical Testi-
mony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 426 (1961): "Since membership
on the panel is represented as the quintessence of objectivity and as
the criterion of reliability and valid opinion, it is obvious that in the
overwhelming number of cases the panel doctor will simply come to
court, deliver his judgment, the medical formulation will be treated
almost as a matter of law and that will be the end of the matter."
155 See note 138 supra.
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entire jury structure in our courts. The panel system is a for-
mula attempt at "slot machine justice" which is no substitute for
twelve men "tried and true." An Omaha attorney states, "If one
carries the 'panel of experts' idea too far, then the next logical
step is not to waste the time of highly qualified experts by trying
to have them 'prove' their excellence to a jury of twelve average
men .... " A North Platte attorney warns against roads headed
toward "dishing out justice": "Should we not then also be re-
quired to have a so-called 'panel of experts' out of the total Bar
so that trials involving personal injury cases may only be con-
ducted by lawyers selected from such a panel? What does this
do to the client's right to seek his own counsel?" In short, many
fear that implementation of the panel system would open the door
to further encroachments on the jury's function as the trier of
fact:
In a situation such as this, where the technical harm lies
hidden deep under a cover of what might appear to be expedi-
ency, and the improvement of our plan of trial, it is necessary
that the judges and lawyers... be vigilant to see that the wrong
path is not taken up, and followed away. First an Impartial
Doctor. Then an Impartial Traffic Expert. Then an Impartial
Safety Engineer. Don't you see where the thing, that you and I
call "a fact question for the jury," is headed? 156
The counterargument first notes that the concept of the medi-
cal panel has been upheld against constitutional objections.1 57
The plan does not contravene the constitutionally guaranteed right
to trial by jury, because the seventh amendment is not a rigid
command that old forms of practice and procedure be retained.
Long ago, Mr. Justice Brandeis expressed the flexibility of that
amendment:
It does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for deter-
mining what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the
introduction of new rules of evidence. Changes in these may be
made. New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institu-
tion to present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument
in the administration of justice.158
156 Berry, supra note 145, at 565.
157 The "Philadelphia Federal" Plan was upheld in Hankinson v. Van
Dusen, No. 12,740, 3d Cir., Oct. 21, 1958, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 925
(1959) (order denying petition which sought to revoke order appointing
doctor under Local Rule 22). See also Porta v. Pennsylvania R.R., Civ.
No. 21,293, E.D. Pa., aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1959). The
grounds of challenge were: (1) invalid exercise of the court's rule-
making power; (2) denial of due process in imposing costs and fees on
plaintiff; (3) tendency of jury to attribute quasi-judicial status to the
impartial expert at trial; (4) medical witnesses cannot de facto be im-
partial.
158 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309 (1920).
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Second, it is argued that the panel procedure not only works
within the spirit of the adversary process but actually strengthens
that process by exposing more fully all the medical facts for
evaluation by the jury and judge. 59 This argument stresses the
successful experience with discovery procedures, which also re-
move some facets of litigation from the adversary process. "The
Plan is essentially a further extension of Discovery Proceedings.
The use of a Court-appointed expert . . . adds an additional skill
or aid to [the] . . . fact-finding function ..... 110 It enables the
court and jury to more accurately evaluate the facts within the
essential framework of the adversary proceeding. The panel ex-
pert's only function is to give medical testimony in keeping with
scientific truths, and it would seem that the court and jury should
have the opportunity to hear all such testimony.
Third, all of the traditional safeguards are still present to
insure the full rights of the adversaries. Parties may still call
their own witnesses, and the court-appointed expert is still sub-
ject to cross-examination, "the greatest legal engine ever in-
vented for the discovery of truth." On the other hand, the claim
that the right of cross-examination still exists has been said to "ig-
nore the litigative facts of life"'-' or, as a Lincoln orthopedist
explains, "The effect of court-appointment will not be overcome
by cross-examination because it will be very difficult to impugn
the integrity of a witness following his appointment by the
court." But the contention that a lawyer cannot effectively cross-
examine a panel expert is fiction, not fact:
The fact is that with the arrival of the impartial witness there
has returned to the trial arena the art of cross-examination....
Cross-examination has two basic approaches, the attack on
the merits and the collateral attack. Little mileage can be made
with the latter when the lawyer is examining a court-appointed
expert....
The important thing is that a carefully conceived cross-examina-
tion, capitalizing on the impartial's objectivity, can serve the
159 MED IcAL-LEGAL COMMITTEE, Op. cit. supra note 112, at 19. See also
Comment, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1957).
160 Address by G. C. A. Anderson to the Section of Judicial Administra-
tion, American Bar Association, Aug. 26, 1956, in MEDIcAL-LEGAL COM-
MITTEE, op. cit. supra note 112, at 28.
161 Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony, 30 PA. B.A.Q. 348, 358 (1959):
"Furthermore it is a curious twist to denominate the jury as incom-
petent to decide medical issues under our present adversary system,
yet competent and qualified to reject the pronouncement of the Court's
specially appointed oracle, labeled by court sanction as giving the best
possible proof."
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purpose history has ascribed to our system, the bringing out of
the truth ...
Upon the merits of a case cross-examination of the impartial
can be helpful and effective, helpful in discovering the truth and
effective when compared with cross-examination of the professional
who spends his life in the witness box. 162
A return to cross-examination on the merits would abolish most
of the sparring between doctor and cross-examiner which is so
distasteful to the medical profession and would remove much of
the element of chance from the litigation. Far-fetched theories
would be quickly discredited, and a greater burden would be
placed upon trial counsel to be well informed about current medi-
cal knowledge concerning the problem at issue.
Proper instruction by the court is an additional safeguard to
the rights of the parties. Under the plan, the court would in-
struct the jury that the testimony of the court-appointed expert is
to be considered together with that of all other experts and that
the jury alone is the trier of the ultimate facts. Since those who
object to the expert panel as an encroachment upon the jury's
prerogatives must presumably do so because of a sincere faith in
the integrity and reliability of juries, they could surely harbor no
doubt that the jury would do exactly as the bench instructed.
They cannot doubt that the jury would judge all experts on the
merits, not because one talks more smoothly or because another
is "cloaked in the exalted robe of the court."
Concealment of the expert's court-appointed status from the
jury has been tried, but has been deemed neither wise nor suc-
cessful.163 The same detriment applies to limiting the function of
the court-appointed expert to pretrial proceedings. If a panel of
three or more doctors is used, the right to file minority reports
would assure an open forum for the exchange of opinions.
Finally, the results in other jurisdictions should be noted.
The New York and Philadelphia experiences particularly empha-
size the fact that juries have not been led down a one-way street
by the testimony of court-appointed experts. 64  Numerous ver-
162 Griffin, supra note 140, at 412.
163 This is not deemed wise, however, on the basis of the Cleveland experi-
ence. Also, the fact of court-appointment could undoubtedly be con-
veyed to the jury in numerous ways by counsel.
164 AssociATioN OF THE BAR or Tim CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL CoMvIIE
ON MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY
34 (1956). See also Philadelphia Report, text accompanying note 121
supra, where nine of the twenty-four verdicts returned were not con-
sistent with the neutral doctor's testimony.
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dicts have mirrored total rejection of the panel expert's opinion.
Thus, there is little evidence to sustain a conclusion that the
expert's testimony will prevail solely because of its source and
totally apart from its merit.
VI. THE PRACTICABILITY OF A NEBRASKA PLAN
Although the majority of trial attorneys across Nebraska ap-
prove of the basic idea of a Nebraska Plan, many express doubt
concerning its feasibility. A Lincoln attorney summarizes this
view:
What is proposed, while admittedly desirable, is probably too
idealistic to be practical.... To adopt the suggested change I
am afraid would put us in about the same position of the surgeon
who reported a successful operation, but the patient died.165
Examination of the specific prerequisites to the implementation
of a Nebraska Plan will allow insight into the validity of this pre-
diction. The successful inauguration and operation of a supreme
court rule for the entire state, or for a local district rule, depends
primarily upon three factors: (1) the selection of cases for
reference to the panel; (2) the selection and cooperation of doctors;
and (3) the provision of funds to finance the procedure.
A. THE SELECTION OF CASES FOR REFERENCE TO THE
PANEL-THE PROVINCE OF THE JUDGE
A Beatrice attorney remarks that "if limited to cases in the
discretion of the judge, the plan might be very effective." Under
this approach, the role of the judge is to decide which cases war-
rant panel examination.166 The attitude of the judiciary, of
course, would play a leading role in the success of the project.
The statistical vote and comments of the Nebraska district judges,
165 An Omaha attorney: "In principle the thought is wonderful, but in
practice I am fearful that it would -not work." A North Platte attor-
ney: "In principle I wholeheartedly agree with an impartial court-
appointed medical panel theory. In practice, it will be a tedious, time
consuming and difficult project to achieve."
166 A groundwork in custom already exists for such referrals. An Omaha
attorney: "[T]he defend.ant has a right to an examination. Sometimes
the plaintiff will not agree to the defendant's choice of doctor. Then
the matter is referred to the court, who then selects a doctor .... So
you see, we do not end up very far from the suggested practice." A
Grand Island attorney: "After hearing in a recent case, great conflict
developed. I suggested to the court and the other attorney that we
have an examination by an expert picked by the court. This was done
and settlement was made on a basis of the court-appointed expert. It
is, however, unusual for plaintiff and court to agree to such a move
and also unusual for the plaintiff to accept the findings."
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and particularly those in the Lincoln-Omaha area (where no nega-
tive votes were cast), indicates great willingness to utilize a panel
system in cases where expert medical testimony is in serious con-
flict.
The decision as to whether a case is to be referred to the
panel should be made sufficiently early in the proceeding to permit
accurate appraisal of the medical facts and at the same time fa-
cilitate settlement before trial. An appropriate point in time
might be the pretrial conference. By the time of the pretrial con-
ference, disputes have usually reached a condition of relative ma-
turity, so that the true extent of physical injury and its probable
permanence can be accurately determined. Yet the event is not so
long passed, nor the positions of the parties so firmly fixed, that
impartial examination will not have a settling effect on opposing
claims regarding the extent of the damages. Thus, during pre-
trial, with the lawyers for both sides before him, the issues clearly
defined by the pleadings, and the medical reports of the doctors
for both parties in his hands, the judge would decide whether the
case was one of such sharp divergence of medical views as to
justify reference to the panel. Consent of the lawyers should not
be required, but requests for the panel should be encouraged.
Once the panel has been invoked, the trial judge or either party
should be permitted to call upon the medical expert to testify at
the trial.
B. THE SELECTION AND COOPERATION OF A SuFFiciENT NUMBER OF
QUALIFIED DOCTORS TO CONSTITUTE THE PANEL-THE ROLE OF THE
MEDICAL SOCIETIES
The success of such a project is obviously dependent upon the
existence and cooperation of the experts which it professes to
provide. The task of selecting these experts should be entrusted
to the medical profession itself. The experience in other juris-
dictions 167 indicates that doctors of high calibre are willing, as a
public and professional duty, to place their services at the
court's disposal. The poll of Nebraska's leading specialists over-
whelmingly confirms the existence of this cooperative attitude
among doctors in all specialties represented.
(1) Omaha-Lincoln area
The existence of this two-city complex would lend itself read-
ily to the implementation of a workable panel system, although
167 See New York, Philadelphia and Chicago results, text accompanying
notes 111, 119 & 124 supra.
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it would necessarily be on a smaller scale than its metropolitan
prototypes, with fewer physicians assigned to the roster for each
specialized panel.168 Once the local medical academies and so-
cieties have selected the names, tenure should be limited to assure
the system new blood and to avoid undue burden on a few doc-
tors. An Omaha orthopedist points out that "this area with two
medical schools and their faculties would seem very suitable for
this step." An Omaha defense attorney agrees:
I feel there would be cooperation, for in the metropolitan Omaha
area we do not, as such, have a statutory county coroner....
Therefore, Nebraska Medical School, Creighton Medical School,
Douglas County Hospital, etc., furnish a medical coroner on a
rotation basis to actually perform autopsies and the like. They
are therefore conditioned and should be willing to furnish medical
experts for the purpose.
Over seventy-five per cent of the attorneys in Omaha and Lincoln
believed that local medical groups would cooperate. 169  Over
ninety-seven per cent of all the specialists polled concurred. 170
The acceptance was so enthusiastic in some medical quarters that
many doctors went on to advocate extensions of the panel sys-
tem.171 A Lincoln orthopedist summarizes the view of the medi-
168 A Lincoln attorney: "We are in a community of 130,000 people, and
there are two orthopedic clinics. In addition to this we have only two
other independent doctors. Thus, as a practical matter, it would be
impossible to have such a system." But certainly the manpower re-
sources of both cities would be more than ample to furnish sufficient
qualified experts on a rotating basis.
169 A strong dissent was voiced by an Omaha attorney: "I doubt very
much that the top medical men in the communities would be intrigued
with the idea of serving on such a panel. They are so busy and making
so much money that even at a cost of between $100 and $150 for an
appearance of an hour or less in court, they are reluctant to appear
because they can make more money in the operating rooms or in
consultation. I feel, therefore, that the men who would consent to
such service might not, perhaps, be the top men in the fields."
170 On the other hand, the dissenting opinion of a Lincoln physician: "It
would be difficult to get local medical groups to cooperate. Most M.D.s
do medico-legal work because they want to, and it would be hard to
get other men to go to court."
171 An Omaha orthopedist: "I would like to see all cases studied by such
a panel prior to or instead of trial." An Omaha psychiatrist: "In ad-
dition to service as an examiner and witness, a specialist could serve
as consultant to the court in some cases and also to the lawyers, advis-
ing as to types of investigation which are necessary, etc." A Lincoln
orthopedist: "A legal medical unit composed of two or three judges
or people trained in legal work should be established to set up the
pretrial conference. These people should be well-trained in the
field. This way we could get more done in pretrial examination than
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cal men:
I would wholeheartedly be in support of a Nebraska Project of
"Expert Medical Panels" that would be utilized in a "Friend of
Court" approach. Furthermore, I sincerely believe that the great
majority of the medical men and professional medical personnel
would be in favor of such a project.
(2) Outstate area
Major manpower problems exist in the judicial districts out-
side the Omaha-Lincoln area.172  Implementation becomes more
difficult further west. A North Platte attorney describes the ob-
stacles:
The suggested medical expert testimony project would be un-
feasible in a small district such as the 13th Judicial District. The
basic reason that such a project would not be successful is the
fact that we do not have all the medical "specialists" in this area
which would be necessary to have on such a board. In situations
where we do have such a specialist, if a board were created for
a district, we would have to take the resident specialist probably
because he would be the only one available .... In a small
town, if the specialist is reasonably competent, I would assume
that the general practitioner would abide by the specialist's judg-
ment. In other words, even a reasonably competent specialist
would "control" the thinking of a board of specialists in other
medical areas or merely bf general practitioners in the commu-
nity.
A Lincoln attorney warns: "It would appear that outside of the
metropolitan areas of Nebraska there would be problems in ad-
ministering this program because of the scarcity of qualified
specialists.' 7 3 A professor at the University of Nebraska College
the way we are currently doing it." An Omaha psychiatrist: "I have
long recommended that the court have its medical 'friends' report
directly to the presiding justice, giving copies of his report to defense
and prosecution."
172 CuRRAN, LAw MN MEDicn;s 360 (1960). Professor Curran, in consider-
ing the large numbers of medical practitioners in New York, asks:
"Considering the size of the medical panels made available in these
areas, what predictions can you make for the establishment of similar
panels in other areas, urban and rural, in the United States?"
113 A Sidney attorney: "Such a program might be difficult to implement
in the outstate communities away from the medical centers. In this
city, for example, there are only four medical offices. There are no
specialists although we have very excellent doctors. No one doctor or
office could serve as the impartial medical expert. There would un-
doubtedly be some reluctance on the part of the local doctors to second
guess the treating doctor's analysis." A Scottsbluff attorney: "Like
all plans, it depends on personnel. In a big city the personnel problem
would not be nearly as difficult as in a smaller community. The
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of Law summarizes:
The major problem outside the big city is in getting enough
different doctors so that it would not amount to the same doctors
handling all cases. That would be bad from everyone's point of
view.
In addition, frictional problems with local medical groups are
more noticeable outstate. A Grand Island attorney says:
[I]t would be most difficult to secure acceptance by doctors
out this way. They are all too busy and I seriously doubt if the
local medical association would take the time to set up the system
or if the doctors would serve willingly. The few doctors who
would or could take the time would be the least qualified ones.
One would also have specific problems. For instance, there is
one qualified orthopedist in our county and another in Adams
County to the south. A case involving this field usually finds
both men involved for one side or the other, and there would be
little chance of cooperation between them.
Similarly, a Kearney attorney says:
I do not believe the competent M.D.s here would care for the
plan, and the others would not be satisfactory. This is probably
a good plan in the cities or federal courts.
A Scottsbluff attorney expresses a comparable view:
Basically, the medico-legal suggestion is good, but we are of the
opinion that it would not work in a community of this size, but
would work in the larger communities and, cities .... Our Coun-
ty Bar Association has had several meetings with the doctors,
and so far, their general impression is that they have not been
sold on the idea. For that reason, all of them would probably
refuse to act on the Boards.
Another Scottsbluff attorney explains:
We haire problemd with medical testimony because doctors do not
like to testify and don't want to take the time necessary to ade-
quately prepare themselves to testify.
In a community of this size (30,000), we have local specialists
in only a few fields .... The appointments under the system
would gravitate either to the men who enjoy testifying but who
are not necessarily the best qualified or to the best qualified who
nevertheless may be, and in some instances are, the worst wit-
nesses.
Attorneys suggest -two alternatives -to alleviate the difficulties
probabilities of the physician having a patient of his who gets in litiga-
tion is sufficiently probable in a small community that the court would
not be able to use the same physician as the court-appointed expert in
every instance." A Kearney attorney: "Frankly, I doubt the compe-
tency of the medical personnel in a rural area such as this to qualify
for such intended use."
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concerning personnel and cooperation in these areas. First, a Blair
attorney suggests that "in Nebraska it would be most practical to
set up a medical panel in each judicial district rather than having
them set up by city or county. The panel should consist of
specialists whenever possible." Likewise, a Minden attorney ar-
gues that
having the panel drawn from the entire judicial district rather
than from the county in which trial is to be had would be the
most feasible for districts composed of multiple counties. In
average size and smaller counties we do not have much personal
injury work, whereas there is some of this type of litigation in
each judicial district. It would further give a larger number of
M.D.s from which the panel could be selected in the multiple-
county judicial district.
The second alternative is to bring the experts to the area re-
quiring them. The actual travelling required of such "travel-
ling panels" could be reduced by having the plaintiff go to the
panel site for examination. Only the panel member who was to
testify would then be required to make the trip to the place of the
trial. Outstate attorneys currently use this procedure, as a Kear-
ney attorney verifies: "We use, extensively, orthopedic surgeons,
neurologists and internists from Omaha, Lincoln, Hastings and
Grand Island." A Beatrice attorney: "[A]t least some specialists
might have to be imported." A Scottsbluff attorney: "[O]ur
best results have been by having the client, if we are representing
the plaintiff, examined by his local doctor and one in Denver,
Cheyenne or Omaha."
There are two limitations on this idea. First, Chief Justice
Paul White observes that
to appoint a roving board would probably create substantial local
reaction in smaller communities of the state. The experts would
undoubtedly come from Lincoln or Omaha and would be sub-jected to the reaction that an expert is somebody who is simply
more than 50 miles from home.174
Secondly, a western Nebraska district judge feels that "the cost
of experts on the panel would be prohibitive to the average
litigant.1 75
174 See note 138 supra.
175 A Sidney attorney verifies: "If we have to bring in experts from the
outside, their personal appearance probably could not be obtained and
taking depositions would add to the expense of litigation unless the
expense were paid from public funds." A Lincoln district judge:
"[T]he travelling panel of doctors might result in prohibitive expense,
unless they could be employed full time which would result in a real
expense item." A western Nebraska judge: "Travel over this distance
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C. THE PROVISION OF FuNDS TO FINANCE THE PROCEDURE
Essential to the success of any system is a workable method
of financing it. A Lincoln district judge explains:
The problem in Nebraska would be securing the necessary funds
to implement the program. There is always the expense involved
in these instances which can be considerable. Litigants object to
the present cost of litigation, and the propriety of using funds in
private litigation presents difficulties in routine cases.176
Several alternatives exist: (a) public funds; (b) tax the costs
equally against both parties; or (c) tax the costs against one
party only.
(1) Public funds
This method was favored by 29% of the district court judges,
19% of the outstate attorneys, 30% of the Lincoln-Omaha at-
torneys and 32% of the doctors. An Omaha attorney raises the
basic issue:
It is very difficult to answer this financial question until we know
what purpose we are serving. If it is one of overall justice, the
expense should be borne by the public, but there are obvious
shortcomings to this solution. On the other hand, if this project
were completely developed and public funds were used, it is very
conceivable that the expense saved by the Court could easily
compensate for the expenditure along the lines of the medical
testimony. 77
either for litigants or medical experts raises serious problems both of
time and expense."
176 SPECIAL COaMITTEE, op. cit. supra note 164, at 35, estimated: "Savings
will be effectuated of more than 10 times the total amount spent for
the fees of impartial experts." The fees for individual examinations,
without trial testimony, through the first six years of the New York
Plan ranged from less than $20 for simple X-rays on one extreme
to as much as $200 for a few of the more elaborate and difficult
assignments. Most of the fees were between $50 and $150. See N.Y.
JuDIcIAL CoNFERENCE ANN. REP., LEG. Doc. No. 94, at 9 (1959).
-77 An Omaha attorney dissents: "I can see no logical justification for
any public body underwriting the expenses which a party may incur
in furthering his individual and personal interests." Another Omaha
attorney: "Such a program to aid indigent persons supported by public
or foundation funds could be of considerable aid as there is no contin-
gent fee arrangement available with respect to employment of doctors
as expert witnesses." And still another Omaha attorney: "It would
be quite difficult to finance such a project, mainly because of the
Omaha Bar Association's experience in attempting to have a Legal Aid
Society Office opened for indigent people in the Omaha area. After
over ten years of attempting to finance legal aid in about every pos-
sible manner, we succeeded in establishing a Legal Aid Office, prima-
rily through the financing of United Community Services."
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The New York experience discussed above illustrates the reality
of the latter prediction.
(2) Both parties equally sharing the costs
This method, which is now being used in the federal plans, is
favored by 43% of the district judges, 53% of the outstate attor-
neys, 46% of the Omaha-Lincoln bar, and 53% of the doctors. An
Omaha attorney summarizes the majority opinion: "I personally
doubt that public finance or foundation funds could finance such
a project. Although primarily engaged in insurance company de-
fense work, I see no reason why the parties couldn't share the
cost of furnishing an expert." An Omaha attorney dissents:
I can see no logical reason why the parties might be required to
share the cost of such a system equally .... [T]his suggestion
implies that the expert would be of equal value to both parties
at all stages of the proceedings which cannot be the case.178
(3) Charge one specific party
This method could result in charging either the prevailing
party or the unsuccessful party in the judge's discretion, charging
as costs, or charging the party who originally requests the ex-
pert, as in the Baltimore Plan. It was favored by 29% of the
district judges, 28% of the outstate attorneys, 30% of the Omaha-
Lincoln attorneys, and 15% of the doctors.
An Omaha attorney voices the objection: "I can see no logi-
cal reason why the successful litigant should be required to do
so. . . . [T]his refutes the theory that the expert is to be inde-
pendent and objective. Moreover, with respect to the second sug-
gestion, who is to determine when a litigant is 'successful' and
when he is not?" An Omaha district judge offers a modification:
"Both parties should equally share the cost if the case is settled.
The successful litigant should pay in the event the trial reaches a
conclusion or it should be included with other costs and assessed
as provided by statute.' 1 79 It should be noted that the method of
178 A Blair attorney: "It seems to me that making both parties share
equally in the cost would be contrary to the idea that a witness should
not be forced upon a person as far as expense is concerned." But
see Hankinson v. Van Dusen, No. 12,740, 3d Cir., Oct. 21, 1958, cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 925 (1959), where such an objection was rejected. A
Lincoln attorney: "It would appear that both parties would benefit
equally prior to trial and should therefore share the fees of the expert."
379 An Omaha attorney: "If the unsuccessful litigant bore the cost after
trial and both parties or the public shared prior to trial, it could settle
some matters that should not go to trial." An outstate attorney: "I
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having one side uniformly bear the costs has been utilized in the
Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, which taxes the ex-
pense to the defendant when an independent examination and re-
port have been required.180
CONCLUSION
One overriding conclusion can be drawn from this study.
"In the broader context, the debate about the medical expert
plan represents only the waves on the surface of the human
sea."18' The stronger, silent undercurrent is dissatisfaction on the
part of the bench, the medical profession, and the majority of
the bar with the current procedure surrounding medical testi-
mony. The strict application of the lawyer's adversary standard
to medical evidence breeds discontent. The testimonial battle of
experts has grown to be a pressing interprofessional problem
with wide public repercussions.
Our adversary system, a system developed in antiquity to
provide for the resolution by laymen of the factual disputes of
their peers, can be utilized to mislead. The court-appointed panel
system offers a tool to help courts and parties attain an objective
which often eludes them in the heat of battle-impartial medical
testimony. The question is one of balancing value judgments.
Distinguished members of the bar are at odds. Some feel that the
battle of experts serves to educate the jury and bring us closer to
the impartial verdict we all seek. Others believe that in many
cannot imagine why a successful litigant should contribute to the cost
of securing such an impartial witness because the imposition of costs
is a large factor in keeping spurious claims out of court. The unsuc-
cessful litigant should pay the expert, his fee to be taxed as costs.
However, to secure the cooperation of local medical groups public
funds would have to be advanced before the expert was called, the
public then being reimbursed by the unsuccessful litigant." A Fremont
attorney: "Both parties should share, providing plaintiff has a rea-
sonable liability case and is not bringing suit solely because of his
injuries. The defense may not be interested in injuries if liability is
questionable."
180 Letter From Presiding Judge Albert Arms, Nebraska Workmen's Com-
pensation Court, Sept. 25, 1964. An outstate district judge favors this
approach: "If the litigants agree upon the use of a court-appointed
expert, they could save the expense of calling experts of their own,
and the cost could be divided between them. If they do not agree, it
might be well to provide that the expense may be taxed as a part of
the costs. In the usual case the costs would be taxed to the loser."
181 Samad, The Doctor, Lawyer and Jury, or Gaffing at a Thing Called
Truth in Personal Injury Litigation, at 17, 1963 (unpublished manu-
script in Akron College of Law Library).
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cases the addition of the court-appointed expert would further
this educational process and bring us still closer to that degree of
positiveness which we will accept in an imperfect world as a
substitute for truth. Dedicated medical men are willing to act as
such witnesses to clear up Hippocratic shadows and to bring the
truth into sharper focus for the jury. The legal and medical
professions should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
the present adversary expert system carefully against those of
the plans which are offered to modify it.
In the meantime, both professions should make a real effort
to educate physicians concerning their responsibilities to the
courts. A closer relationship and more frank discussions between
the two professions can help to temper medical advocacy and en-
courage expert objectivity. When the professions set a standard
that demands that a physician, testifying under oath in court,
must state his opinion fairly and fully, without bias and without
regard to the side that calls him, neither suppressing nor over-
emphasizing any aspect of the case, they will have taken an
important step toward providing the trier of fact with real expert
medical testimony.8 2  And the parade of paid partisans will no
longer come to the courtroom to do battle for a price.
[T]he time . . . [has] surely come for the professional expert to
be taken out of the ranks of the ordinary witness with an inevi-
table bias in favour of the party who called him. He should be
put upon a different plane, where his prime allegiance ...
[is] to the court and his undoubted duty in law to submit his find-
ings of fact and conclusions fairly, fully and frankly for all to
see.188
182 Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 Yale L.J.
247 (1910).
M83 Summary of presidential address by Sir Thomas Lund, Third Annual
Meeting of the British Academy of Forensic Sciences, 106 SOL. J. 617
(1962).
